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INTRODUCTIClf 
Class action procedure is a mechanism which enables a single or 
"representative" plaintiff to individually bring an action in which his or her 
claim is resolved along with the claims of others who have a similar cause of 
action against the defendant. Class action procedures exist in varying forms 
in most legal jurisdictions. In New Zealand such procedure is accommodated in 
Rule 78 of the High Court Rules. 
The underlying concept of the class action - a single individual acting as the 
representative of many raises unique issues in legal systems which are 
founded on the notion of individuals facing each other with each ultimately 
rewarded by, and accountable for, his or her actions, This uniqueness 
combined with the reluctance of legislatures to provide guidance on the 
substantive issues abounding in this area has subject the rules to the 
fluctuating development of case law. 
This paper suggests that the case law developments in New Zealand have not 
advanced the rule to a form which maximises the benefits that such procedure 
can offer. It is suggested that the merits of a widely accessible and 
expanded procedure outweigh the possible costs of such a development, and that 
legislative reform of Rule 78 and other obstructive elements is necessary, 
The paper examines the issues central to the class action question, and 
suggests solutions appropriate to the New Zealand context. 
The question of reform will be addressed with close reference to procedures 
used overseas and to recent developments and proposals in both Canada and 
Australia. 
While it is possible to have class defendants as well as plaintiffs, the 
device is most frequently used by plaintiffs and this paper focuses only on 
that aspect of the law. 
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L_ WHAT IS A CLASS ACTIOO? 
The class action has its origins in the courts of equity. Equity saw the need 
for a process which avoided large numbers of persons having similar claims 
from pursuing separate actions against the same defendant. An earl~er rule of 
compulsory joinder which forced all persons interested in the subject matter 
of the suit to become parties proved difficult to manage in practice. Equity 
thus responded with the class action, This course of development occurred in 
both England and America. 1 
The class action was developed as a device by which a single plaintiff could 
pursue an action on behalf of all persons with a common interest in the 
subject matter of the suit. The ruling of the court would bind all class 
members, This was perceived as a means of fostering both judicial economy and 
social utility - the courts would no longer be inundated with numerous claims 
relating to a common subject matter, and individual plaintiffs with claims too 
small for individual pursuit were provided access to the courts. In the 
United States the class action also served an effective enforcement function, 
especially in the areas of civil rights, anti-trust and securities law 
violations. 
It has often been mistakenly asserted that class actions and representative 
actions are different devices. New Zealand and England have rules known as 
"representative", whereas the United States rules are known as "class". 
Although different in form, these rules are of identical nature, and are 
merely specialised developments of the more general class action concept. 
Thus although the New Zealand rule has special characteristics which appear to 
distinguish it from the American "class" description, essentially it remains a 
class action device. 
Further confusion of terminology occurs with the distinction between class and 
derivative actions. The shareholders derivative action is a device which 
arises out of the exceptions to the rule in Toll v Harbottle. 2 In a 
derivative action, the plaintiff brings the action on behalf of the company to 
remedy a wrong done to the company. The confusion in terminology arises 
because the plaintiff must frame his or her action as representative of all 
the members of the company rather than the company itself, The action is thus 
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representative in nature but derivative in form. A more typical 
representative action involving a non-derivative claim on behalf of the 
shareholders could occur, for example, where the company proposes to act lA.l..t.n 
Yllli• 
CLASS ACTICB PROCEDURE IN NEW ZEALAND 
Class action procedure in New Zealand is more familiarly known as 
representative procedure, Rule 78 of the High Court Rules provides: 
Where two or more persons have the same interest in the subject matter of 
a proceeding, one or more of them may, with the consent of the other or 
others, or by direction of the Court on the application of any party or 
intending party to the proceeding sue or be sued in such proceeding on 
behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. 3 
The interpretation of Rule 78 is largely governed by the case law on its 
precursor, Rule 79 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4 Rule 78 is little 
different to Rule 79, and significantly it repeats those characteristics which 
have seriously detracted from the use of the procedure, English case law has 
played a substantial part in the shaping of the New Zealand procedure, based 
on the interpretation of these characteristics in the inherently similar 
English rule, 5 
The major difficulties with the rule stem from the judicial interpretation of 
the term "same interest", 
The leading case which forms the basis of "same interest" analysis in England 
and New Zealand is Duke of Bedford v Ellis 6 . In that case, a group of stall 
holders in a market sued on behalf of themselves and "all other growers of 
fruit, flowers, vegetable, roots and herbs," The action was intended to 
enforce various preferential rights the stall holders contended were owed to 
them, The case resulted in the seminal statement per Lord Macnaghten: 7 
Given a common interest and a colTITlon grievance, a representative suit was 
in order if the relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all whom 
the plaintiff proposed to represent. 
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Lord Macnaghten' s formula was not further expanded in the case, but it is 
clear there is considerable overlap between the three elements in the test. 
The number of actions bought under the procedure in New Zealand have been 
few. The paucity of case law in the area has meant an accurate assessment of 
when an action is appropriate or is likely to succeed cannot be made, and this 
acts as a considerable deterrent to the utilisation of the procedure. Many 
other factors, though, have acted as a disincentive to the bringing of actions 
in class form. These factors are outlined below. A more thorough examination 
of the problems and possible solutions is made later in the paper. 8 
The foremost disincentive has been the limitations on the pursuit of damage 
claims. New Zealand cases have duplicated English restrictions in their 
interpretation of the requirement of "same interest". This interpretation 
initially imposed a blanket restriction on the use of the procedure for damage 
claims, thereby reducing the economic feasibility of the procedure. Although 
recent case law has somewhat pierced the restriction, the area is still very 
uncertain and remains far behind the level of utility that has been achieved 
in the United States with a more liberal approach. 
Another factor which acts as a limitation on the use of the procedure is the 
financial costs involved in bringing an action. The problem arises not so 
much from the actual expense of the action, but from the "free-rider" notion. 
The free-rider effect concerns the unjust enrichment of non-contributory class 
members. Class actions are brought by a representative plaintiff on behalf of 
the class. The members of the class, although they may benefit from the 
action, are under no obligation to contribute in any manner to the 
litigation. This financial burden on the representative plaintiff exists as a 
serious disincentive to class actions. 
Three main areas of cost are pertinent to the problem: legal costs, party and 
party costs, and the costs of notice. The New Zealand legal system offers 
very little to soften these blows on the representative plaintiff. Although 
many options exist to overcome these cost barriers to litigation, each raises 
significant questions about who should most appropriately finance an action. 
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L. THE OOESTICJf OF REFORM 
Any question of altering the existing Rule 78 class action procedure must 
carefully address what such changes will achieve, and at what cost. 
international context the pace of class action reform is rapid. 
In the 
In 1982, the Ontario Law Reform Commission of Canada ("OLRC") produced a 
comprehensive report on class actions. 9 Although the report has not yet been 
legislatively acted upon in Ontario, the legislative proposal of the 
Commission remains an intelligent initial source of reference for an 
examination of this topic. 10 
In Australia, the Australian Law Reform Commission has been working on a 
document proposing reform since first issuing a discussion paper on the topic 
in 1979 . 11 More immediate changes in Australia include a recent legislative 
reform of the Victorian and South Australian class action procedures. 12 
The general focus of these international reforms has been to overcome the 
restrictiveness of the case law by recognising the procedure as a more 
flexible device, to remove some of the extra-judicial obstacles to the use of 
the procedure (such as the costs factor), and to make the rules more 
procedurally express so as to eliminate uncertainty as to the appropriateness 
of the procedure. 
Whether or not an expansion of the procedure to increase its utility is 
appropriate in New Zealand involves a weighing of the benefits and costs of 
the use of class action procedure. 
in turn. 
4.1 THE BENEFITS OF EXPANSIOO 
4.1.1 ACCESS TO THE COURTS 
The benefits and costs will be discussed 
Court actions by individual persons on behalf of themselves are often rendered 
impracticable because the potential costs far outweigh the returns. By 
combining many of these individually untenable complaints the cost of 
litigation is dramatically decreased for the plaintiffs, and a realistic 
access to the courts is created. 
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It is often argued that increased access to the courts will lead to litigation 
which ought not to have been brought at all. In other words, the cost system 
serves the useful and desirable function of weeding out actions which do not 
deserve judicial attention. Opponents thus contend that class actions should 
be restricted only to an amalgamation of existing viable individual claims, 
The weakness of this argument is the assumption that the viability of an 
individual claim gives an accurate assessment of its legitimacy and 
importance. Merely because the cost of bringing a claim makes it untenable 
does not dismiss its social importance. Indeed, providing access for 
untenable claims has been described judicially as one of the most important 
goals of class actions, 
stated: 13 
In Naken v General Motors of Canada Ltd, Arnup J 
[when consumers purchase a defective article].,. in many instances the 
pecuniary damages suffered by any one purchaser may be small, even if the 
article is useless, It is not practical for any one purchaser to sue a 
huge manufacturer for his individual damages, but the sum of the damages 
suffered by each individual purchaser may be very large indeed, In such 
cases it would clearly be convenient and in the public interest if some 
mechanism or procedure existed whereby the purchasers could sue as a 
class, 
Thus the vindication of the rights of groups of people without effective 
strength to litigate is seen as a meritorious step even at the cost of an 
increase in volume of litigation, 
4.1.2 JUDICIAL ECONOMY 
There is no disagreement that class actions can achieve judicial economy where 
numerous individually recoverable claims exist. By litigating multiple small 
claims as a single action economies can be achieved both administratively and 
in terms of efficacious use of court time, 
This benefit, however, must be viewed as more theoretical than real. The 
number of cases in which many individually practicable claims exist will be 
few, The real effect of an expansion will be to stimulate the condensing of 
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many individual claims which would not be individually pursued, 
likelihood, this would lead to an increase in the amount of litigation. 
In all 
4,1,3 BEHAVIOUR MODIFICATION 
An extended class action procedure can play an important role in the behaviour 
modification function of justice. The potential for large judgments against 
the defendant acts as a disincentive to the defendant or other potential 
defendants from risking or attempting further wrongs. Without this 
disincentive the wrongdoer can proceed in his or her activities without fear 
of any judicial recourse, 
Some commentators argue that the only proper function of civil litigation is 
to redress conflicts between parties, and not to discourage future 
conduct. 14 These opponents argue that the objective of deterrence should be 
pursued through criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions, However, law is often 
recognised as having a behavioural 
capacity. 15 
responsibility in a much broader 
The function of a legal system is not limited to its role in providing 
individuals with a mechanism by which to resolve disputes and redress 
grievances. Law also serves as a standard of the conduct which the 
community or the society expects from its members and by the same token, 
the judicial system should provide realistic sanctions which the 
community can invoke in order to enforce obedience to its prescribed 
values and rules of conduct. It seems clear, therefore, that if sellers 
and manufacturers are, for whatever reason, in practical effect immune 
from the sanctions of the present legal structure with respect to some 
claims which might be brought against them, the community has to that 
extent lost its ability to compel obedience to the standards of conduct 
it has established. 
Any restriction on the degree to which class actions may operate has a 
commensurate effect on social control through the law. An extension of the 
class action procedure would both serve as a means of encouraging compliance 
with the law, and halt the feeling of impotence and dependence on Government 
intervention which many small claimants suffer, 
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4.1.4 RESOURCE EFFECTIVENESS 
Closely associated with the behaviour modification benefit are the benefits 
accruing from a more efficient use of resources. Present sanctions for 
improper actions in company management may be inadequate deterrents in many 
situations. 16 Penalties are often token in relation to the extent of the 
improper gains made. 
The reality of the situation is that with fixed sanctions of fines or 
imprisonment, an opportunity is provided for a wrongdoer to weigh the costs of 
his or her actions. As the OLRC concluded: 17 
Even where a criminal sanction is available, and a conviction is 
obtained, there is evidence to the effect that the fines levied in 
criminal proceedings do not serve to deprive defendants of the fruits of 
their wrongful conduct or to require them to internalize the costs of the 
injuries imposed upon individual victims; accordingly, in many cases a 
conviction may do no more than impose a "licence fee" upon wrongful 
conduct, which remains sufficiently profitable to justify continued 
wrongdoing. 
If the benefits of the wrong exceed the sanctions then the deterrent and 
prevention resources of the legal system are being ineffectively utilised. By 
providing the responsibility of redress to the individuals harmed through a 
damage claim process, the potential cost of wrongful conduct becomes greater, 
and resources are being more effectively utilised. 
4.1.5 PREVENTION OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Equity has continuously devised mechanisms by which to prohibit unjust 
enrichment, viewing the creation of wrongful windfalls as an action worthy of 
redress. Without an extended class action procedure, wrongfully obtained 
profits remain in the possession of the wrongdoer. 
The process by which unjust enrichments are extracted from wrongdoers is known 
as cost internalisation, and involves forcing the defendant to compensate the 
victims in regard to the degree of damage caused. This redistribution of the 
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enrichment is seen without disagreement as an equitable and fair action. Thus 
by extending the class action procedure a more equitable system of redress is 
created. 
4.2 THE COSTS OF EXPANSIOf 
4.2.1 STRIKE SUITS 
Class action procedure has sometimes been described as a process for legalised 
blackmail and an "engine of destruction" • 18 These criticisms stem from the 
perceived potential for class actions to be used as a means of exploitation. 
A strike suit describes the process where frivolous or unmeritorious actions 
are bought with the singular intention of inducing the defendant to settle the 
claim. The calculation by a defendant to settle for such insubstantive 
actions is based on a number of coercive circumstantial factors. 
First, the large outlay of both time and cost required to defend an action can 
be a deterrent even when there is a good prospect of a successful defence. 
This problem is exacerbated in jurisdictions where costs are not awarded to 
successful litigations. Second, the sheer size of the claims often involved 
encourages defendants to settle. Even if the defendant is reasonably certain 
of a favourable outcome, a small degree of doubt can often lead to a 
settlement when in the context of a multi-million dollar claim. Third, a 
defendant may be offered the prospect of settling for a very small amount, 
often with only the class plaintiff in an individual capacity. The small 
price of this compromise often takes precedence over a formal resolution of 
the issue. Fourth, even if the defendant is sure of a favourable outcome, 
there is an extensive risk of adverse publicity. The propensity for 
newspapers to engage in witch-hunting escalates the potential cost of an 
action so as to render settlement more favourable. Finally, the defendant 
must also be concerned with balance sheet implications. The detrimental 
effect of a large damages claim appearing in the balance sheet discourages 
defendants from letting the plaintiffs file an action. 
Despite these indications of the potential for exploitation by the class, 
empirical evidence indicates there is "no basis for concluding that class 
actions are yielding disproportionate numbers of early settlements that might 
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reflect a pattern of 'legalized blackmail'" . 19 Part of the explanation for 
this lack of exploitation are the mechanisms which can be used to weed 
frivolous and meritless claims from the procedure, The first is a procedural 
requirement that the action satisfy certain tests before it can be certified 
as appropriate for class form, In the United States, a complicated 
certification process locates the weakness of frivolous claims and prevents 
them from proceeding into litigation, 20 Second, all civil actions before the 
courts must satisfy the natural safeguard of being able to state a cause of 
action. If no reasonable cause of action can be illustrated by the 
representative plaintiff, then the action can be frozen at an early stage, 
eliminating most of the financial outlay that the defendant would have been 
required to make in defence, 
The problem of potential defence costs acting as an incentive to settle is 
often met by the general rule that costs will be awarded to a successful 
litigant. This means any outlay the defendant makes in defending the action 
will be ordered to be compensated by the plaintiff, Even where rules 
prohibiting costs prevent this type of compensation, a more flexible approach 
could permit such recovery only in exceptional circumstances, such as where a 
claim is frivolous. 
In summary, an expanded class action procedure will not necessarily create a 
strike action problem if the procedure is drafted appropriately. 
4.2.2 UNFAIR SETTLEMENTS 
Because of the peculiar representative nature of a class action there exists 
the possibility of unfair or abusive settlements. These involve settlements 
made entirely for the benefit of the class plaintiff, and/or the class lawyers. 
As the class plaintiff is representative of the interests of the whole class, 
any settlement the plaintiff reaches should encompass the interests of the 
class. But often a representative plaintiff may bring a meritorious action in 
class form, not to benefit the class, but solely to inflate the possible 
settlement value of the plaintiff's individual claim; or alternatively, where 
the intentions of the plaintiff are good but the defendant makes a generous 
offer to induce a rapid settlement with the individual. 
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This abuse of the class action procedure is unfair not only to the defendant, 
who may settle for more than the individual claim of the representative 
plaintiff, but to class members, whose claims are exploited for the personal 
gain of the representative plaintiff. Although the action could be continued 
by a new representative plaintiff, this often proves difficult if the 
representative was so selected for his or her financial or other capabilities. 
Settlements favourable to class lawyers can often be more damaging because the 
whole class is bound by the settlement and cannot pursue the action in court. 
Solicitors can engage in damaging settlements when their form of payment is by 
way of contingency fees. This takes the form of a payment of the solicitor 
Q1lly on the result of a successful litigation. To avoid the risk of 
non-payment, solicitors can be induced to settle the claim for substantially 
less than could have been awarded through litigation. 
This guarantee of payment benefits the solicitor, but is often not in the best 
interests of the class. This exploitation is often possible due to the 
misinformed state of most classes. 
The problems of unfair settlements are not without remedy, however. A 
convenient device to overcome this exploitation is to require an informed 
consent to the settlement before it can be regarded as valid or binding. This 
informed consent could be either judicial, or from a body such as the law 
society, and would effectively eliminate this potential problem. 
4.2,3 FLOODGATES FEAR 
Another significant concern of extending class action procedures is that 
existing judicial and administrative resources will be flooded by a large 
quantity of new class actions. This may overload the legal system to the cost 
of the greater administration of justice. 
Many arguments exist to dispute this concern . 
.First, it is a sound argument that legitimate legal claims should not be 
sacrificed in order to meet the existing capabilities of the legal system. 
Thus even if a flood of litigation was imminent, resources should be expanded 
accordingly, rather than questioning the merits of potential claims in law. 
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Second, the floodgates concern fails to recognise the many other elements 
which detract from litigation. Questions of litigiousness, costs, other 
changes to the form of the procedure, the extent of civil rights provisions in 
the legal system, and social behaviour trends, all influence the quantity of 
litigation. The extension of the class action procedure is but one variable 
in a multi-variable equation and will not necessarily cause any substantial 
change. 
Finally, there is the empirical evidence from the extension of the United 
States class action procedure in 1966, 21 This major revamping of the Federal 
Rule was promised to involve a drastic flood of existing legal resources. The 
flood never eventuated however, and the system quite comfortably accommodated 
a gentle increase. 
Any extension of the class action procedure does raise the possibility of 
increasing the volume of litigation. But due to the number of variables 
involved no absolute determination of volume can be made. Although a flood of 
overloading proportions is not a serious likelihood, this area is still worthy 
of further investigation in an attempt to determine some indication of 
possible effects. 
4.2.4 MANAGEABILITY 
Opponents of an extension of class action procedure also contend that such an 
extension will encourage unmanageable claims, and will result in procedural 
innovations of an undesirable character in the process of accommodating 
difficult damage claims. It is submitted that this is an unlikely consequence 
due to the strong indications from United States case law as to what 
procedural innovations are appropriate, and the consequences which follow from 
them. 
4,3 COOCLUSIOf 
Although there are many problems stemming from an expanded class action 
procedure, closer examination reveals that many of the costs are more severe 
in theory than in reality, and that most of the costs can be controlled or 
mitigated through carefully drafted provisions within the rule itself, It is 
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submitted that the significant benefits that can be achieved from a limited 
and cautious expansion of the procedure outweigh any remaining cost residue • 
..5...... THE NA1.'URE Of THE EXPANSICJJ 
The nature of any reform must be carefully assessed. It must take into 
account the benefits sought to be achieved, the nature and philosophy of the 
New Zealand legal system, and avoid the pitfalls found in the procedures of 
other jurisdictions. 
The OLRC proposal provides a useful starting point for consideration of the 
substantive aspects of the rule because of the comprehensive examination of 
the issues which accompanies the proposal. 22 In addition, comity suggests 
that any proposals which come from the Australian Law Reform Commission should 
also be considered. The appropriateness of these proposals to the New Zealand 
context will be evaluated. 
Five main issues require specific analysis in respect of the nature and extent 
of the reforms. They are: damages and common interest: certification: 
notice: exclusio"l from the class: and costs. These issues will be 
respectively discussed below. 
DAMAGES AND CCMMCE INTEREST 
The damages and common interest issues are closely connected to each other. 
The common interest issue involves the degree of common interest that must 
exist between class members for the procedure to be used. More specifically, 
whether or not the presence of questions of law or fact unique to individual 
class members prevents the use of the procedure to resolve questions common to 
the class. The damages issue involves the case law which has suggested that a 
class action is never appropriate in a claim for damages because questions 
unique to each individual class member would always have to be resolved. 
Whether or not such a blanket prohibition on damage claims is justifiable has 
been discussed at length in recent case law developments in both New Zealand 
and overseas. 
Because the overseas case law has had such a formative effect on the 
development of the New Zealand procedure, it is appropriate to examine the 
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furor of activity that has occurred overseas before looking at the New Zealand 
context. In each jurisdiction examined the history of the damage restrictions 
will be discussed, and an indication will be taken from the current case law 
as to the extent of reform necessary in New Zealand. 
6.1 ENGLAND 
Rule 12 of the English Supreme Court Rules provides: 23 
( 1) Where numerous persons have the same interest in any proceedings, 
not being such proceedings as are mentioned in Rule 13, the proceedings 
may be begun, and unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or 
against any one or more of them as representing all except any one or 
more of them. 
The difficulty in respect to the damages and common interest issues arose out 
of the same interest requirement in Duke of Bedford v Ellis. 24 The 
definition required that class members have a common interest, a common 
grievance, and be seeking relief that was beneficial to all class members. 
The most influential case to develop this requirement was the Court of Appeal 
in Markt & Co v Knight Steamship Co Ltd, 25 The case concerned the loss of 
cargo aboard a ship sunk during the Russo-Japanese war, The plaintiffs sued 
for damages on behalf of themselves and all other cargo owners, The Court 
held that the case could not proceed as a class action. 
apparent in the judgments. 
Two reasons were 
First, each of the members of the purported class had separate contracts with 
the owner of the vessel and therefore did not meet the test that each person 
must have a "common interest". 
It is submitted that this reason is difficult to accept. The substance of 
each contract may have been different, but there existed issues common to each 
member of the class which could appropriately have been resolved in common 
proceedings. The fundamental misjudgment that the Court made was to view 
class actions as only appropriate where all or substantially all of the issues 
were common to all of the members. Buckley LJ was the only member of the 
Court that recognised what later became known as the two stage process, 
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whereby the court resolved in common proceedings those issues common to the 
class, and in separate individual proceedings resolved the individual issues. 
Buckley LJ stated that if the action had distinguished between those persons 
shipping contraband items and the others, then the interests of the class 
could be the same, and a declaration of liability could be obtained followed 
by "further steps such as are always necessary in a representative action to 
give to the represented parties the particular relief to which each is 
entitled". 26 
Second, Fletcher Moulton LJ held: 27 
Where the claim of the plaintiff is for damages the machinery of a 
representative suit is absolutely inapplicable. The relief which [the 
plaintiff] is seeking is a personal relief, applicable to him alone, and 
does not benefit in any way the class from whom he purports to be 
bringing the action. 
The underlying notion in Fletcher Moulton LJ's reasoning is that a claim for 
damages involves issues specific to each plaintiff and that a representative 
action would be inappropriate because of the diversity of interests that would 
necessarily be present in any class. 
This decision had a profound effect on class actions in England, restricting 
classes to non-monetary remedies. With injunctions and declarations as the 
only available relief, the economic feasibility of instigating a class action 
was diminished. 
The prevailing influence of Fletcher Moul ton LJ' s judgment is puzzling when ' the circumstances are considered closely. 
First, accepting that the basis for the decision was to prevent the use of 
class actions where there was a diversity of interests, the Lord Justice took 
the dicta much further than was appropriate by advocating a blanket 
prohibition for damage claims. This ousted damage claims even in situations 
where all the issues were sufficiently common, such as shareholders' actions 
against the company where the issue of liability is the same for the whole 
class. 
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Second, the judgment was inconsistent with the earlier decision in Duke of 
Bedford which stated that class actions are a device of efficacy and were to 
remain flexible tools of convenience. 28 
Salmon: 29 
This was aptly stated in Taylor v 
I thought it the duty of this court to adapt its practice and course of 
proceeding as far as possible and not, from too strict an adherence 
to forms and rules as established under very different circumstances, 
decline to administer justice, and to enforce rights for which there is 
no other remedy, 
However since 1970 there has been an indication that the influence of Fletcher 
Moulton LJ's views may be coming to an end, 
In the 1970 case of llQilll v .Re_ti30 the Court re-emphasised the idea of 
flexibility expressed in Duke of Bedford v n..l.li, The case involved a 
representative action by a member of the Pembrokeshire Divisional Labour Party 
on behalf of all other members challenging the validity of certain executive 
appointments within the Party's ranks. The procedure was described as "being 
not a rigid matter of principle but a flexible tool of convenience in the 
administration of justice," 31 
More importantly, there has been considerable substantive development in the 
case law. In the landmark case of Prudential Life Assurance Co Ltd v Newman 
Industries Lta32 the representative plaintiff instigated a class action on 
behalf of all the shareholders in Newman Industries Limited for a declaration 
that the defendants had committed certain frauds and breach of duty causing 
them monetary loss. 
damages. 
It was an action for declaration of entitlement to 
In this case Vinelott J adopted the two stage approach suggested by Buckley LJ 
in Markt, The Court sought to overcome the objections raised by Moulton LJ 
that damages were of a personal nature inappropriate to class treatment by 
creating a simple three stage test. First, no order would be made in favour 
of a representative plaintiff if the order could have the effect of conferring 
on a member of the class a right he or she could not have asserted in 
individual proceedings, Second, no order would be made in favour of a 
representative plaintiff unless there was some element common to the claim of 
- 17 -
all members of the class represented. Third, the court must be satisfied that 
it is for the benefit of the class that the plaintiff be permitted to sue in a 
representative capacity. 
Vinelott J thus maintained the restriction on the~ of the damages due to 
the requirement of individual proof for its determination. If a class award 
was made when individual proof of liability was necessary then some 
individuals may be wrongly conferred a right to damages. But it was possible 
to permit the action for a declaration of entitlement to damages where there 
were common liability issues to be resolved. 
then proceed on the basis of this declaration: 33 
Individual proceedings could 
Normally if not invariably, the only form of relief that will be 
capable of being obtained by the plaintiff in his representative capacity 
will be declaratory relief. A person coming within the class will be 
entitled to rely on the declaration [as to damages] as res judicata, but 
will still have to establish damages in a separate action. 
This two stage process thus allowed a partial use of the class action process 
in damage recovery, and was an important step forward. Although the decision 
of Vinelott Jin favour of the plaintiff was later reversed in the Court of 
Appeal, 34 the issue of the class action damages award was not considered 
there. Thus Vinelott J's decision still stands, though of limited influence 
as it remains a first instance ruling, 
The Court of Appeal decision did, however, restrict the ambit of the class 
procedure to a plaintiff recovering damages resulting from a personal wrong 
committed by the defendant. Wrongs committed by the defendant which affected 
the shareholder through the effects on the company were derivative and 1!Qt 
personal, meaning no form of individual liability existed, and hence no class 
action could be pursued. 
The next notable achievement towards damage recovery came in 1981 in the case 
of EM! Records Ltd v .Ri.J.n. 35 In EM!, the two stage process adopted by 
Vinelott J was discarded, the Court instead favouring the possibility of a 
direct award of damages. The case involved a representative action for an 
inquiry as to damages by members of the recording industry over breaches of 
copyright by a cassette pirate. Dillon J distinguished the restriction 
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Prudential had maintained on the awarding of damages by contending in the 
circumstances the two stage process would be impractical. Individual proof by 
members of the industry would be extremely difficult, and as all members 
belonged to the representative body, the British Phonographic Industry 
("BPI"), an award to this body in a representative capacity would be most 
practicable. Dillon J stated: 36 
It would seem to me that it is appropriate that damages should be 
recovered by the plaintiffs in the representative capacity in which they 
are entitled to sue for an injunction, and it would be a wholly 
unnecessary complication of our procedure if the court were to insist 
that for the purposes of the inquiry as to damages, all members of the 
BPI must be joined as co-plaintiffs or issue separate writs. 
This is a strong, if somewhat amorphous, recognition that in~ instances a 
class action for damages may be resolved in a single class proceedings. As 
with Prudential, however, EMI is only a first instance decision, and does not 
necessarily reflect the future of the case law. Another first instance case 
marginally preceding EM.I adhered to the Markt approach. 37 This leaves the 
area still considerably uncertain, and ripe for legislative activity. 
6.2 CANADA 
Class action procedure in the various Canadian provinces has followed a path 
of development similar to that in England. The Ontario procedure will be used 
as a basis for discussion due to the extensive class action reforms proposed 
there by the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC) in 1982, 38 and the utility 
of this study in an analysis of the inherently similar New Zealand rule. 
Rule 75 of the present Ontario Rules of Procedure provides: 
Where there are numerous persons having the same interest, one or more 
may sue or be sued or may be authorised by the Court to defend on behalf 
of, or for the benefit of all. 
Canadian courts were for many years burdened by the constrictive Ma..r..k._t 
decision in their interpretation of same interest. No class actions for 
claims for damages were permitted. But in the 1970s, social pressures 
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impressed the judiciary with the necessity to develop a representative 
procedure. The result was a change in the climate which favoured a case law 
development of the class action procedure. 39 
In Farnham v Fingola40 the Ontario Court of Appeal pierced the blanket 
restriction to examine whether a claim for damages involved issues specific to 
each class member. The action involved a twenty-five million dollar damage 
claim by minority shareholders in the company. The cause of action arose 
because the defendants allegedly failed to inform the plaintiffs of a third 
party's offer to purchase the Company at share value plus premium. The Court 
granted leave to file a class damage claim because the assessment of damages 
to the class was not dependent upon the need to resolve individual issues. 
Jessup JA stated: 41 
In the present case it is clear from both the respondents arguments that 
the only damages alleged by the plaintiff to have been sustained by the 
class he represents, including damage for conspiracy, is the gross 
premium above market price received by the controlling shareholders on 
the sale of their shares to Stanton Pipes Limited and that the individual 
entitlement of members of the class is simply to a pro rata share of such 
gross premium. 
Five years later further restrictions on damage claims were temporarily swept 
away by the Ontario Court of Appeal. In Naken v General Motors of Canada 
I&a42 a group of representative plaintiffs pursued an action for damages on 
behalf of every purchaser of a certain model of a General Motors car. Counsel 
for the class attempted to bring the case within the principles adopted in 
Farnham, by claiming that all class members had suffered identical damages of 
$1,000 in the form of depreciation. The Court of Appeal accepted this 
contention, but held that individual proof would still be necessary if the 
Court required each member to establish reliance. 
This posed a dilemma to the Court: to oppose an award of damages to class 
members because of the presence of individual issues ( in the knowledge that 
individual pursuit of the individual issues would be largely impracticable) or 
to allow the class action to continue and by some means overcome the 
individual requirements. The Court of Appeal chose to allow the claim for 
damages to continue as a class action. Arnup JA specifically stated that the 
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social utility of access to justice played a major role in this decision. 43 
However, this step required a major degree of procedural innovation. The 
solution was that the common questions of liability would be dealt with by the 
Court, and following a favourable determination for the plaintiff the 
individual issues could then be examined by a Court appointed referee, 
This had the dual effect of permitting class actions even where individual 
issues were present, and providing a means for resolution of individual issues 
that avoided the impracticability of additional individual claims. 
This development was short lived, In two subsequent decisions the Ontario 
Court of Appeal itself rejected the use of such procedural innovations, and 
refused to allow class proceedings for damage awards in situations where 
individual proof was necessary. 44 
The final demise came when the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on the ~ 
appea1 45 and the decision of the Court of Appeal was overruled. The Supreme 
Court held that class actions for the award of damages would not be permitted 
where individual proceedings were necessary to establish the total liability 
of the defendant. Although this limited the potential for the pursuit of 
damages, the restriction was not a total prohibition. If the total amount of 
the defendants liability to the class can be established through common proof, 
then the action may proceed by way of class action. This decision draws the 
Canadian case law to a position similar to that established by the Prudential 
decision in England. 
6.3 UNITED STATES 
Class actions are frequently ( some would say too frequently) utilised in the 
United States. Although many varying forms of class action exist at the state 
level, the most litigated provision is that which operates in the Federal 
courts. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure46 distinguishes 
itself from the rules of the other jurisdictions discussed through its address 
of significant class action issues and comprehensive code of procedural 
requirements. 
One of the major distinguishing factors of Rule 23 is its preliminary 
requirements that the action is one appropriate to the procedure. The 
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appropriateness requirements form a certification stage before the issues are 
heard. This provides a safeguard for both defendants and class members 
against the problems of inappropriate use of the procedure. 
One of the appropriateness requirements establishes a preliminary test for 
class actions for damages. 
factors. 
Rule 23 (b) ( 3) requires the satisfaction of two 
The first is known as the predominance factor. This factor has the effect of 
excluding actions which do not involve a predominance of common issues, What 
constitutes predominance has not been clearly enunciated in the case law. 
However, it has been decided that the need for individual proof in claims for 
damages does not destroy predominance if common issues of liability are 
predominant. 47 
The second is known as the superiority factor. If the court can determine 
another procedural method for disposing of the claim which is more efficient 
than a class action, then a class action will not be certified. 
requirement has also been the subject of much conflicting case law. 48 
This 
These preliminary procedural questions form an initial hurdle for any damage 
claim to get over. It is suggested that the rule may have become top heavy in 
that too many procedural questions are forced before the courts before the 
action can proceed. This inevitably makes the procedure a very protracted and 
expensive option. The uncertainty resulting from the conflicting case law has 
also created a problem for potential litigants. 
Despite these obstructions, however, the United States attitude towards damage 
claims has been far more relaxed than the English model. 
First, Rule 23 expressly recognises that the presence of individual issues 
within the class claim does not restrict the use of class procedure. 49 
Secondly, the courts have made efforts to expand the utility of the procedure 
to cover claims even where individual issues would need to be resolved in 
order to determine the total extent of a defendant's liability. In other 
words, courts have not been overly concerned with the notion of conferring on 
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the defendant a liability he or she may not have incurred if individual 
actions were bought. 
When faced with actions involving individual issues essential to the liability 
determination, the courts have adopted some unique and controversial 
solutions. Among them include the idea of conducting mini individual trials 
within the body of the class action and the possible use of a referee or 
similar impartial adjudicator to resolve those issues. This process is known 
as the split trial, and was a development which was rejected by the ~ 5o 
case in Canada. This technique, however, is subject to its own manageability 
limitations, and is often ineffective where the class is very large, where the 
identity of all the class members is not known, and where the split would 
cause the action to be unduly protracted. 
Perhaps the most graphic example of the United States attitude towards damage 
recovery and the courts flexibility towards the issue, is the concept of 
punitive estimated awards. Where it would be impracticable or impossible to 
resolve in separate actions those questions unique to individuals, the courts 
have approved the use of computers and survey techniques supported by expert 
evidence to compute the loss suffered by the class. 51 
One of the most controversial estimation methods has been the "fluid recovery" 
approach. In ~ v Yellow Cab Co 52 an action was bought on behalf of all 
the passengers of a taxi company to have used the service over a specified 
period during which the Cab Company was unlawfully overcharging. The Court 
recognised the overcharge was incapable of individual assessment, and indeed 
the class members were incapable of identification. However, the Court was 
concerned with the punitive notion of the action, and ordered the Company to 
reduce its fares by the overcharge amount over an equivalent time period. 
This resulted in many persons who were not members of the class recovering 
under the action, but had the desired punitive effect on the Company. The 
case was quite exceptional, however, and has met with little judicial 
acceptance. 
In summary, case law treatment of claims for damages where individual issues 
are involved has been innovative as the courts have sought to give the 
procedure an extensive ambit of utility. The concept of punitive estimated 
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damages has gained much case law support, though some aberrant decisions have 
taken the concept to unfavourable extremes. 
6.4 AUSTRALIA 
As in Canada, the Australian class action procedures differ among the various 
states. They are all derived from the English rule, however, and contain the 
undefined "same interest" component. 
The early case law developments in England again provided the basis for 
interpretation of the rules. The recent developments of Prudential and EM.I 
have not yet been judicially commented upon in Australia. 
The restrictiveness that resulted from the Markt case was to the detriment of 
many actions which should have had the opportunity of legal recourse. This 
was the view of the Australian Law Reform Commission which proposed amendment 
to the class action procedure in 1977. 53 Although not adopted on a national 
basis, steps have been taken in both Victoria and South Australia to reform 
their respective class action procedures. 54 
It is submitted that the intent of the reforms was to deal with the 
restrictive elements raised in Mar.kt,. 
The South Australian reform55 expressly states that class proceedings will 
not be inappropriate for the resolution of common issues merely because the 
actions arise out of separate transactions, or that there is a claim for 
damages that would require individual issues to be resolved. The rule also 
expressly recognises a two stage resolution process whereby common issues 
would be resolved in class proceedings, and individual issues would be 
resolved in separate actions or separate trials within the actions. 
The Victorian reform 56 is more restrictive. It is submitted that it allows 
resolution of common issues when individual issues remain outstanding, but 
requires the common issues to arise from the same series of transactions. In 
the context of the reforms, however, it is suggested that this restriction is 
likely to receive a generous case law interpretation and will not manifest 
itself as a hindrance. Its purpose is merely to ensure that there is some 
degree of commonality to all the class claimants. 
IJ\'/v UBRAR ~ 
VIC10:-:l!ft. ~JNtVl':.Na'! Y Of W(Ll.,l-1G1' 
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In terms of class actions for damages, the most significant part of the 
reforms is the high degree of procedural flexibility given to the courts. 
Both states allow the courts to fully determine the conduct of the action. It 
is submitted that this may be the device by which the courts open up the 
procedure to allow total resolution of damage claims containing individual 
issues, Whether or not this would involve a descent into some of the United 
States excesses, or would merely involve a step towards estimated damages, is 
open to speculation. 
It is also important to note that without some form of commensurate changes to 
other factors which deter the use of the procedure (such as the costs 
structure), the reforms may only be of limited effectiveness in achieving the 
benefits that. can accrue from an expanded procedure. 
No case law has yet determined the efficacy of the changes. 
6.5 NEW ZEALAND 
The treatment of damages and common interest in New Zealand was for many years 
in line with the English approach. 
In the case of Talta Kerekere v Cameron57 two tenants seeking to represent 
many other tenants sued for damages for trespass. Chapman J rapidly dealt a 
severe blow to the future of class actions in New Zealand by adopting without 
analysis the reasoning of Moulton J from Markt. Be held: "A representative 
action is inappropriate to the settlement of numerous claims for damages 11 , 58 
In Morgan v Taranaki Farmers Meat Co Ltd59 112 shareholders attempted to 
bring a representative action claiming damages for rescission of a contract to 
take up shares and other relief. The action was struck out by Ostler Jon the 
basis of unspecified authorities. 
This ended the early history of the representative action for damages in New 
Zealand. The renewed activity in the field of class actions in the overseas 
context has sparked a new judicial approach to the device in recent years, 
however. 
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In the case of The Auckland Paraplegic and Physically Disabled Association 
Incorporated v South British Insurance Co Ltd and Others, 60 the damages issue 
was discussed by Barker J, In an earlier application the applicant had 
claimed to be entitled to sue the defendant as representative of all the 
creditors of the Securitibank group. Motions were filed by the defendants 
seeking orders that the reference to the representative capacity in the 
pleadings be struck out. The applicant subsequently consented to such 
motions. The defendants, however, went on to claim costs in relation to the 
class procedure application. This involved Barker J having to determine the 
propriety of bringing the action in class form in the course of making a 
judgment on the costs question. 
Although indicating that in the circumstances the multiple and diverse 
interests of the "class" members were too wide to constitute a single class, 
Barker J, whilst stating that he was not deciding the question, proceeded to 
recognise the developments in the Prudential case. He said: 61 
It seems that, as the law is developing as shown by the Prudential case, 
representative action can be brought for a declaration that a tort has 
been committed in given and typical circumstances. However, ... the Court 
will need to ensure that every claimant, with facts peculiar to him, must 
prove his cause of action, even though he may obtain some advantage from 
a claim made in a representative capacity. 
The issue was not discussed again until 1986, by which time there had been 
further progress in England in the form of the EMI decision. In the cases of 
R,J, Flowers Limited v ~ 62 and E,L. Fairey & Sons v Palleson Farm Limited 
and Ano.t.h.e.!:63 , McGechan J decisively broke new ground in the use of the 
device in New Zealand. 
The cases involved the cool storage of quantities of kiwifruit. The Defendant 
had contracts with many growers of fruit. The action arose from an allegation 
that the Defendant allowed the temperature of the store to negligently fall to 
a damaging level. The Plaintiffs applied to the Court for an order that each 
Plaintiff may take representative proceedings. 
In determining how the new Rule 78 should be interpreted, McGechan J made 
express reference to the High Court Rule 4 requirement that all rules be 
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interpreted to secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of a 
proceeding". Focussing on the need to fashion the rule to apply and develop 
it to meet modern requirements, he said: 64 
the approach to this application should be liberal • • • if injustice can 
be avoided the rule can and should be applied to serve the interests of 
expedition and economy, both indeed the underlying reason for its 
existence. 
The conclusion McGechan J came to on the basis of the English developments was 
that a class action was appropriate if: 
1. Members of the class had a common interest in the proceedings, and each 
must have been able to claim as plaintiffs in separate actions in respect of 
the event concerned. 
2. The action was beneficial to all of that class. 
3, The action covered virtually the whole of the class of potential 
plaintiffs. 
Where a claim for damages existed a class action was appropriate if: 
4. The global loss of all represented members could be established. 
5. The consent (or implied consent) of all represented members to the 
payment of global damages was established. 
It is submitted that the result of his analysis is that where individual 
issues are present (thus necessitating individual proof) an action for damages 
can only be resolved in respect of those individual issues where the need for 
the individual proof can be made superfluous by the provision of global 
proof, A judgment based on global proof must not confer any additional right 
on any individual member of the class. That is, it must not impose any 
unjustified burden on the defendant. Indeed, McGechan J expressly commented: 
"The traditional concern to ensure that representative actions are not to be 
allowed to work injustice must be constantly kept in mind". 65 
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Where individual issues cannot be resolved by global proof, it is submitted 
the McGechan analysis would allow the action to proceed in respect of those 
common elements only. The res judication established could then aid the rapid 
resolution of the individual issues in separate actions. 
Concerning the question of whether the existence of separate contracts 
prevented the use of class proceedings, McGechan J did not treat the presence 
of separate individual contracts with the defendant as an impediment in 
itself. The Court was only concerned with the presence or not of common 
questions of law or fact for every member of the class. 
The decision of McGechan J is first instance only and there exists a recent 
English case inconsistent with his findings. 66 The future of this current 
development is uncertain. It is submitted that some form of legislative 
action is necessary to bring a degree of certainty into the area. 
6.6 CCfiCLUSICfiS 
It is submitted that the following ideas flowing from the case law should form 
the basis of a new provision in New Zealand. 
First, class actions should not confer on a class member any right or remedy 
he or she would not have had if an individual action had been brought. This 
reflects the basic precept that no person should benefit from or impose a 
penalty on another without an appropriate cause of action. To this extent, 
class actions should be considered inappropriate in any instance where the 
ruling of the court is on any issue where common interest does not exist. 
Second, despite the existence of individual issues or parties infected by 
issues not common to the representative plaintiffs, a class action should 
still be able to be brought in relation to only those common elements of the 
claims. This allows the advantages of class actions to accrue to the 
plaintiffs in the form of a res judication on the common issues. 
If individual issues are present in a damages claim it is necessary that the 
whole action be resolved as a two stage process, with separate actions brought 
to resolve the individual issues. If, however: 
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1. The total liability of the defendant can be determined without the need 
for reference to individual issues, and the group structure of the class makes 
a class award appropriate; or 
2, The individual liability to each member of the class can be determined 
also without the need to resolve individual issues (and hence no need for 
individual proof); 
-then a class procedure would be appropriate and could resolve the action in a 
single stage. 
The United States case law, however, goes significantly further than this and 
has expanded the ambit of the rule to accommodate damage claims for amorphous 
classes even where global liability could not possibly be assessed by normal 
methods. This has been achieved through a willingness of the courts to 
estimate damages. 
The OLRC also recognised the need for a large degree of procedural 
flexibility, and proposed a procedural discretion that would allow the courts 
to adopt the split trial approach developed in the United States, whereby the 
courts can determine individual issues within the body of the class 
action. 67 The proposal suggests the courts may conduct such proceedings 
alone or with other judges of the court, or appoint one or more persons to 
resolve the issues by way of inquiry and report. 
It is submitted that this proposal is a meritorious compromise between the 
excesses of the United States expansion and procedural innovations, and the 
restrictiveness and limited utility of the present New Zealand rule and case 
law. The emphasis of the discretion is revealed in section 31(2), which 
states: 68 
In giving such directions [as to the individual proceedings] the court 
shall order the simplest, least expensive and most expeditious method of 
determining the issues that is consistent with justice to the members of 
the class, the defendant and the representative plaintiff, including 
dispensing with any procedure that it considers unnecessary and directing 
special procedures regarding such matters as discovery, admission of 
evidence and means of proof. 
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It is submitted that the movement towards the split trial concept is desirable 
in respect of the need to maximise the benefits which the procedure can 
nurture. However, it must be recognised that the breadth of the discretion 
given to the courts to conduct the proceedings may be a Pandora's Box in 
respect of the questionable procedural innovations which were spurned from the 
United States obsession with widening the rule and using it as a punitive 
device, If such was the case, then the legislature should be prepared to 
partake in further reforms to control the extent of the discretion, perhaps at 
the cost of the accessibility of the procedure. 
CERTIFICATICti 
The process of certification is the means by which the courts determine at a 
preliminary stage whether an action should be brought as a class action. It 
exists as a safeguard against the unnecessary and often exploitative costs of 
unmeritorious actions, and allows the procedural issues to be resolved before 
the action is actually commenced. It is submitted that this safeguard is 
appropriate, as the certification test can examine not only questions related 
to the "same interest" issue, but other factors that may indicate an action is 
not suitable for the class procedure. In this respect, the OLRC proposal 
provides a suitable structural framework for a certification test. Much of 
the content of the proposal, however, is of questionable suitability to New 
Zealand. Each of the five requirements of the proposal will be discussed in 
turn. 
1. "The action is brought in good faith and there is a reasonable 
possibility that material questions of fact and law common to the class will 
be resolved in favour of the class". 69 
It is submitted that the former part of the rule is justified because it 
prevents unmeritorious strike actions; and helps to control the increase of 
pressure on the administration of justice. It would be hoped, however, that 
most actions brought without good faith would be weeded out before this stage 
through a lack of a cause of action. 
The criticism of this provision is in respect of the latter part. Although it 
reflects the need to protect the defendant from the considerable consequences 
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of even an unsuccessful action, it imposes an additional burden on the 
plaintiff and requires the courts to hold a "mini-trial" of sorts in advance 
of the main action. It is submitted this element is undesirable in that the 
cost to the plaintiff betrays the precept that a plaintiff need only establish 
a cause of action before the merits of the case are examined by the courts. 
2. "The class is numerous". 70 
This requirement contains all the ambiguities contained in the United States 
rule, offering no guidance as to what size class constitutes numerosity. The 
existing New Zealand rule requires only "two or more persons", achieving 
certainty with a minimum requirement. It is submitted that this certainty 
provides the better option, and if for small classes a process of joinder 
would be more efficient this can be caught by that part of the OLRC proposal 
which requires the class action to be superior to other methods of 
resolution. 71 
3. "There are questions of fact or law common to the class". 72 
This requirement is carried over from the United States provision requiring 
some commonality of issues which warrants pursuing the action in class form. 
This would replace the "same interest" requirement in the New Zealand rule 
which generated the difficulty in regard to the pursuit of damages. 
The major problem with this provision is its failure to define the nwnber of 
common issues that must exist. It is submitted that there need only be one 
issue common to the class for the social benefits of a class action to 
accrue. However, it is suggested that in the interests of pragmatism and 
efficiency there should be included a test that the issue be one of 
"significance". 
4. "A class action would be superior to other methods for the fair and 
efficient resolution of the controversy 11 • 73 
This superiority evaluation focuses directly on the comparative merits of 
pursuing the action in class form. Such a test has numerous justifications 
and is essential in the certification process. First, the greater 
administrative burden imposed by widening the class action ambit warrants that 
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the pursuit of the claim in class action form is truly superior. Second, any 
innovations to the cost system resulting in substantial benefits to those 
pursuing class actions would warrant being restricted in use to the most 
suitable claims. Third, class actions involve a determination of issues on 
behalf of unrepresented parties. Because they involve this added 
responsibility class actions should afford the absent members greater security 
by requiring a class action is the superior method. 
5. "The representative plaintiff would fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class", 74 
This requirement comes directly from Federal Rule 23. The OLRC viewed an 
adequacy requirement as an essential component of the certification stage. A 
basic tenet of the New Zealand system of justice is that no person should have 
his or her rights determined without being afforded an opportunity to be 
heard. Because class actions may involve decisions being made for absent or 
unascertained class members by which they will be bound, it is an essential 
safeguard that the representation of the class is adequate. 
Fundamental to this protection are the factors the courts must address to 
decide the adequacy of the representation. Important issues which any New 
Zealand proposal should aim to cover would be: whether the plaintiff should be 
a member of the class; whether adequacy considerations should be influenced 
by the adequacy of the class solicitor ( and, if so, how is that measured); 
whether the financial position of the plaintiff should have any effect; and 
the degree of difference in interest there can be between the class and the 
representative. The failure to addre~s these questions in the United States 
provision has resulted in a degree of case law uncertainty that should be 
avoided. 
One of the more contentious aspects of the OLRC proposal was the inclusion of 
a cost-benefit analysis. This comes as a second stage to the certification 
test, and provides the courts with a device to deny certification where the 
detriment of bringing the action in class form outweighs the benefit. The 
provision reads: 7 5 
Where the court finds that the conditions set out in subsection 3(3) have 
been satisfied, it may nevertheless refuse to certify the action as a 
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class action if, in the opinion of the court, the adverse effects of the 
proceedings upon the class, the courts or the public would outweigh the 
benefits to the class, the courts or the public that might be secured if 
the action were certified. 
This provision thus permits exclusion even when no alternative access to the 
courts exists for the individuals. 
Certain criticisms can be levelled, however, in response to the vagueness of 
the considerations that the courts must take into account. It has been argued 
that the test requires "a measurement and then a weighing of factors that are 
enormously difficult to measure and virtually impossible to compare". 76 In 
practice, such difficulties may lead to a vein of uncertainty within the 
rule. The pragmatism of the provision is also open to criticism. Even if a 
claim is administratively unworkable by present standards, if it is a 
meritorious claim there is a sound argument for adapting or remoulding the 
legal system with a view to accommodation. 
licence to avoid administrative inefficiencies. 
The courts should not be given 
On balance, however, it is submitted this is a pragmatic test that must be 
accepted in a legal system with finite resources. If the courts are deprived 
of the power to exclude administratively unmanageable claims there will be a 
constant struggle to arrive at methods of accommodation. Such efforts may 
result in bizarre and undesirable procedural innovations. This is one of the 
failings of the United States provision, where the absence of such provision 
has forced both procedural innovation and a misshaping of the literal 
construction of the rule to facilitate exclusion . 
.L. NOTICE 
The question of notice refers to the process by which members of the class 
receive advice that an action is being pursued on their behalf, The need for 
notice derives from the fact that once decided, the ruling of a court binds 
the whole class. Thus if a class representative could bring an action without 
the knowledge of the class members, and achieve a result which would prohibit 
individual pursuit of the action, a fundamental injustice could occur. For 
this reason a suitable notice provision is essential to provide the class 
members an opportunity of deciding their loyalties to the class. 
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In New Zealand, Rule 78 provides little guidance. If the action proceeds on 
the basis of the consent of the class members, then, by definition, notice has 
been given. However, where the plaintiff seeks to bring the action by the 
judicial consent option, notice is not explicitly required. One assumes the 
rules of natural justice extend to notice in such situations but no standards 
are provided for how notice should be given, 
In the United States, the case law has established strict requirements in 
respect of the unspecific Federal Rule requirement of "the best notice 
practicable". 77 In E.ifilrn v Carlisle and Jacquelin78 the Supreme Court held 
that if individual class members were identifiable, notice must be given to 
each individual irrespective of other impracticabilities such as cost. 
The OLRC proposal involves a more flexible requirement. 79 Both the giving of 
notice and the form it takes are a discretionary option that the courts must 
examine. The courts may take into account such factors as the cost of giving 
notice, the nature of the relief sought and the total amount of monetary 
relief claimed. 
The primary concern with the creation of such a discretionary notice provision 
is the vast area of uncertainty for the plaintiff in terms of the potential 
cost of the action. 
Some advantages over a mandatory provision do exist, however. The mandatory 
notice provision in the United States is a cumbersome problem which bas 
deterred many claimants. Because the courts cannot determine the 
appropriateness or form of notice in regard to the circumstances of each case, 
the burden of notice is often inflated and unnecessary. The factors the 
courts may take into account in the OLRC proposal are designed to require 
individual notification only in cases where the seriousness or importance of 
the action warrant it. Thus al though the Canadian approach may somewhat 
compromise the right to be informed of the action, it is submitted it is 
beneficial in its pragmatic facilitation of access to justice. 
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EXCLUSIOO FR()( THE CLASS 
Part of the function of providing notice to the potential class members is to 
enable them to decide whether or not to participate. As any class action 
ruling will bind all the class members, the potential members must make a 
decision whether or not they wish to be part of such an action, The 
notification provision can be drafted in two ways, however, It can 
automatically include the member unless he or she expressly opts out. Or 
alternatively, it can automatically exclude the member unless he or she 
expressly opts in. 
The existing New Zealand provision is silent on this point, and the issue has 
not been discussed in case law, 
The question of which is the superior alternative is a difficult issue to 
resolve. Opting in is criticised for its exclusive effect on apathetic or 
silent parties. Where damages will be small, the incentive for individuals to 
commit themselves to involvement will be small, This will have positive 
effects of reducing the administrative burden caused by an expanded class 
action procedure, and weeding out frivolous claims. However it also damages 
the behaviour modification goal by substantially reducing the size of the 
class or number of actions, and establishes an exclusion clause which 
effectively sanctions the unjust enrichment of the defendant, 
Opting out, by contrast, has the opposite effect, and is the option used in 
Federal Rule 23. 80 Apathetic or silent parties will be automatically 
included thus artificially increasing the magnitude of the class beyond the 
actual level of interest. This has the effect of inflating the level of 
damages the defendant would otherwise be faced with, thus perhaps forcing 
behaviour modification beyond the real social requirements. It may also 
compound or contribute to the administrative stress faced by the courts by 
bringing inflated actions beyond their realistic size. However, access to 
justice is greatly facilitated for persons who avoid interaction with the 
legal system, and most importantly, a more equitable proportion of the unjust 
enrichment would be extracted, 
The OLRC solution to the opting problem was to create a form of opt out 
scheme. 81 This is distinct from the traditional opt out concept, however, in 
that the right to exclusion from the class is within the discretion of the 
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courts. This means, that irrespective of the members' individual desires, 
they may be bound by the action, 
The factors the courts must take into account reflect this concern, They must 
consider all relevant matters, including: whether members of the class who 
exclude themselves would be affected by the judgment; whether the claims of 
the members of the class are so substantial as to justify independent 
litigation; and whether there is a likelihood that a significant number of 
members of the class would desire to exclude themselves, 82 
The proposal is of a pragmatic nature in that it seeks to avoid class members 
opting out and jeopardising the benefits than can be gained by bringing the 
action in class form, However, it is submitted that the proposal should not 
be followed in New Zealand. It promotes the punitive aspects of the procedure 
which, in the United States, has resulted in the class action being used 
somewhat as an oppressive device. 
The foremost function of the procedure should be to provide a means by which 
parties can receive compensation for wrongs committed against them. That is, 
the magnitude of the penalty brought against the defendant should reflect the 
actual degree of harm that individuals feel so motivated to act upon. This 
means that only an opt in proposal is capable of satisfying both parties' 
perceptions of justice, and should be the option that is followed, 
1,__Q._ COSTS 
The cost of litigating a class action claim can be a major deterrent to the 
pursuit of any such action, Costs to the representative plaintiff are almost 
invariably out of proportion to any potential benefit that may individually 
accrue from the action. This means that the potential benefits of the class 
action procedure will be eliminated unless there is some mechanism by which 
representative costs can be controlled. Three types of cost are pertinent to 
the discussion: legal costs; party and party costs; and the cost of notice. 
10.1 LEGAL COSTS 
Legal costs are those costs incurred by the representative plaintiff for the 
services of legal representation. Due to the size and complexity of class 
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actions, legal expenses tend to be very high. If the representative plaintiff 
is seeking only a small amount of damages, or is seeking non-monetary relief, 
it is often not economically sound to pursue the action. Most class actions 
will be impracticable if plaintiffs must bear their own legal costs, 
However, certain solutions exist to overcome this cost burden, one of which 
operates in the United States and is responsible for inducing many court 
actions there. The potential solutions are: a form of legal aid; class 
contributions; and contingency fees, Each will be discussed below in turn. 
In New Zealand, the Legal hid Act 1969 restricts the granting of legal aid to 
"any person", but excludes "any body of persons" from this term. 83 By 
definition, this would exclude a "class" from any aid. This has also been the 
opinion of the English case law, which has precluded classes from an English 
equivalent of this provision. 84 
Even if legal aid could be granted to a body of persons the strict financial 
tests imposed by the Legal hid Act 1969 would preclude all but the most 
destitute plaintiffs. 85 Particularly in the context of securities laws, it 
is suggested that plaintiffs having shares in listed companies are unlikely to 
meet the tests for legal aid, yet the costs are such that even the most 
affluent shareholder would be reluctant to bring an action. 
In Quebec, the legislature took the view that representative actions bring 
relief to a large number of people for whom the costs of bringing the action 
would outweigh the benefits. 86 Even though collectively a class could afford 
to pursue the action, the purpose of the class action reforms is to encourage 
litigation, a goal which would not be achieved purely through compulsory class 
contributions. The resulting system was one that provided a form of legal aid 
to the class, and extracted the value of the aid from any award subsequently 
made in its favour. 
It is submitted, however, that despite the need to facilitate access to 
justice, legal aid is never appropriate where the cumulative financial means 
of the body in question is sufficient to bear the cost burden. The use of the 
State to support actions in these circumstances involves an extensive free 
rider effect at the cost of the taxpayer, and would also act as an incentive 
for classes to pursue unmeritorious claims. If classes with genuine claims 
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wish to pursue the claims through class procedure, it would seem appropriate 
that the risk of financial investment in the action should fall on those 
parties who would receive the direct benefit of an award. Although there is 
an inherent social benefit that stems from the use of the procedure, it is 
submitted that this is a secondary benefit and should not be seen as a reason 
for the taxpayer to subsidise the direct beneficiaries. 
The free-rider basis on which class members benefit without contribution to 
the costs of litigation is, it is submitted, a form of unjust enrichment 
inconsistent with principles of fairness. The most appropriate solution would 
be to extract the costs of the action from the individual class members. 
Although this would accord nicely with prevailing social notions of user pays, 
in practical terms it would have the effect of scaring off class members from 
participation in the action due to of the potentially high costs involved in 
bringing an action in class form. However, this effect can also be seen as a 
benefit in that it acts as a mechanism to weed out non-viable claims and 
safeguards the defendant. 
It is submitted that class contributions are the most equitable means of 
financing class actions, but they could also operate in conjunction with a 
form of limited contingency fee arrangements. 
Contingency fees in the United States are a tool through which access to the 
courts is increased, Contingent fees involve a system of conditional 
payment. Lawyers conduct cases on the understanding that legal fees will be 
awarded ~ on the successful outcome of an action, However, there exist 
many potential detriments and dangers associated with their operation. 
One significant problem was aptly stated by Buckley W in Wallersteiner v 
Moir (No 2 ) : 8 7 
Under a contingency fee agreement the remuneration payable by the client 
to his lawyer in the event of his success must be higher than it would be 
if the lawyer were entitled to be remunerated, win or lose; the 
contingency fee must contain an element of compensation for the risk of 
having done the work for nothing, It would, it seems to me, be unfair to 
the opponent of a contingency fee litigant if he were at risk of being 
ordered to pay higher costs to his opponent in the event of the latter's 
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success in the action than would be the case if there were no contingency 
fee agreement. 
Contingency fees have also been criticized as encouraging a winning attitude 
to the sacrifice of legal ethics; promoting a conflict of interest between 
solicitor and client; and encouraging the solicitation of clients and stirring 
of litigation by solicitors. These undesirable outcomes were the reason for 
the laws of champerty and maintenance in England, which effectively prohibited 
contingent fees, Such fees are still not sanctioned by the New Zealand Law 
Society's Code of Ethics. 88 
The question now to be answered is whether the need for access to 
representative procedure outweighs the potential abuses of contingent fees. 
This was the question indirectly faced by the Court in Wallersteiner 89 , a 
case involving a derivative claim. A majority of the Court held that in the 
case of a minority shareholders action, a contingency fee arrangement could 
not be justified. However, it was held that the plaintiff would be entitled 
to full indemnity for his costs from the company. Lord Denning, however, went 
on to exclude the possibility of a contingency fee system in a wider context 
on the basis of questionable public policy considerations. 
This was not the view taken by the OLRC, who concluded that a representative 
plaintiff should have a right to enter into a contingent fee arrangement, and 
the amount of the fee would be a matter for determination by the courts. 90 
The agreement would be subject to strict statutory conditions: 
( 3) An agreement.,. shall not stipulate the amount of the payment either 
by a gross sum, commission, percentage, salary or otherwise, and any such 
stipulation is void. 
( 4) Where the representative plaintiff and his solicitor have made an 
agreement ... the court that has given judgment on the common questions or 
has approved a settlement shall ... 
( a) determine the amount of the solicitor's fees and, in addition 
thereto, an amount that is fair and reasonable compensation to 
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the solicitor for the risk incurred by him in undertaking the 
action on a basis of payment only in the event of success •.•. 
This proposal would effectively control the problem of excessive fee setting 
by solicitors ( such as a percentage of the award), but does not expressly 
deal with other problems such as solicitation of clients and conflicts of 
interest. It is submitted, however, that the benefits of contingency fee 
arrangements far outweigh these more minor problems. They not only facilitate 
greater access to justice, but they do so by levying the cost of such access 
on the parties to whom the benefits of a successful action will accrue (that 
is, the solicitor and the class). They also provide an effective device to 
ensure only viable claims are pursued, due to the potential cost detriment to 
the solicitor for a loss in the courtroom. The remaining ethical 
complications of contingency fees are questions which the legal profession 
itself should turn its mind to, and should not stand in the way of increased 
access to justice. 
10.2 PARTY AND PARTY COSTS 
Party and party costs ( "party costs") refer to the legal fees and other costs 
of the successful party. The award of party costs against an unsuccessful 
litigant reflects the need to compensate the successful litigant for the 
burden of bringing or defending an action. 
In New Zealand, the awarding of party costs is totally within the discretion 
of the courts. 91 As a general rule, costs will follow the event, meaning an 
award for the costs of the successful party will be made against the 
unsuccessful party. 92 
As with legal costs, this potential consequence has a weeding out effect on 
actions. As the class is not bound to contribute to any party cost award 
against the representative plaintiff (as they are not parties to the action), 
it is unlikely that many representative plaintiffs could be found to bring 
anything but the most cut and dry actions. This raises the question of 
whether some form of control on party costs is appropriate in order to greater 
promote the use of the procedure. 
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The OLRC favoured the United States practice of not awarding party costs. 93 
The proposal varied from the United States model though by providing the 
courts a discretion to award costs when it would be unjust not to , and in the 
event of vexatious, frivolous or abusive conduct. 
It is submitted that neither the United States rule nor the OLRC proposal is 
desirable for a New Zealand proposal. The concept behind party costs is that 
if a disputant chooses to test the claim or defence of another disputant, then 
he or she must accept the cost of forcing that other party to prove the 
correctness of his or her assertion. This concept is equally valid in the 
context of class actions, perhaps even more so considering the large costs 
required to contest such claims. 
It is suggested that the existing New Zealand party costs provision is 
suitable for a New Zealand class action proposal. Under the present rules, if 
it appeared that justice would not be well served by the award of party costs 
a court could simply decline to make any award. This flexibility allows both 
the underlying concept and the interests of justice to be served. 
By avoiding any sheltering of the representative plaintiff from the burden of 
costs the class is also forced to confront the question of whether or not to 
make an undertaking to protect the plaintiff against any award. In reality, 
such an undertaking would necessarily be required before an action could 
proceed. By forcing the class to make such a C011'111itment, the potential cost 
of the action is appropriately spread over all those who seek to benefit from 
its success. 
10.3 COSTS OF NOTICE 
Although, like legal costs, a successful party can have the cost of providing 
notice to class members awarded in his or her favour, the difficulty arises 
from the enormous initial outlay that may be required by the representative 
plaintiff. The problem is somewhat lessened if the class has undertaken to 
bear the cost of the action. The question remains, however, whether there 
should be provision to defer or avoid the enormity of the outlay that may be 
required of the class (or alternatively, the plaintiff) until the action has 
been resolved. 
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The OLRC met part of the cost problem by giving the courts a discretion as to 
the means of notification, This means the courts may, in certain 
circumstances, approve a form of notice less expensive than individual 
communication, 94 The OLRC did not, however, address the more fundamental 
question of who is to meet the initial outlay of the notice expense, whateve~ 
form the notice may take, 
falls on the plaintiff, 95 
The presumption would be that this initial cost 
A possible solution would be a discretion for the courts to apportion the cost 
of notice between the parties as was adopted by the OLRC in its proposal on 
the costs of general notice, 96 The discretion would be likely to take the 
form of the preliminary test that was first suggested by the United States 
case law, involving an examination of the merits of the case and an order 
favouring the class plaintiff if it appeared there was a reasonable likelihood 
that the issues would be resolved in favour of the class. 97 
It is submitted that this deferment does not serve the interests of fairness, 
The defendant should not be burdened with any costs of the other party until 
the case has been fully heard and the defendant has had his or her opportunity 
to test the claims of the class, As with the other costs questions, the 
immediate onus connected to the specific use of class action procedure should 
fall on the party seeking to gain the benefit from the use of the procedure . 
.lL. CCifCLUSI(Jf 
The current class action procedure available in Nev Zealand is in need of 
legislative reform, Considerable benefits can be achieved from a widely 
accessible procedure, one of the more important being the vindication of the 
rights of large groups of wronged individuals whose individual claims are 
untenable, Such a vindication creates accountability for wrongdoers, and 
forces the cost internalisation of unjust enrichments. Such benefits could be 
more readily achieved through a re-drafting of Rule 78 to eliminate some of 
the disincentives to bring actions in class form, 
A New Zealand provision should attempt to crystallise the developments in the 
damages and common interest area which have been recognised in the recent E...Ju. 
Fairey and R,J. Flowers cases, 98 and which reflect the current trend of 
authorities emerging from England and Canada. The United States practice of 
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estimated damages should be followed to the limited extent approved by the 
OLRC by giving the courts liberal control over the conduct of the action. A 
cautious eye would have to be kept on the development of the estimated damage 
concept to avoid an insidious slide towards some of the United States excesses. 
The OLRC proposals on the other major issues provides an appropriate structure 
from within which to work reforms appropriate to the New Zealand context. A 
general theme running through the proposals seemed to avoid placing any 
financial responsibility on the class in respect of the costs faced by the 
plaintiff. This theme should be rejected in favour of a self help or user 
pays ethic, which would ensure that those who were to receive the benefit of 
an action fully contributed to any gains that were to be made. 
Class action procedure will increase in significance in New Zealand in the 
next few years as reforms continue overseas and New Zealanders become more 
aware of the possible ways to enforce their rights. The attempted use of the 
device is likely to become more prevalent, especially in the context of 
creditors and shareholders actions where the economic downturn of the past 
year has created much corporate instability. This change in social need for a 
representative device should be taken as an incentive to precipitate movements 
towards legislative reform in this country. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
CtiTARIO LAW REFORM C01MISSICJi DRAFT BILL 
An Act respecting Class Actions 
HER MAJF.SfY, by and with the advice ancf;cooscnt of the 
Lepalative Assembly of the Province of Ontario, enacts as 
foUows: 
l. In this Act, 
(a) "certify" means to permit an action to be maintained as 
a class action, but does not mean to approve the merits 
ot the action except to the extent prOYidcd by clause 
3(3Xa); 
(b) •c1a.ss action" means an action certified u a class action 
by an order made under this Act; 
(c) •court" means the Supreme Court or a county or district 
court; 
(d) "discovery" means examination for discovery or pro-
duction and inspection of documents under the rules of 
court. and "to discover" h.as a corresponding meaning. 
COMMENCEMENT Of ACTION 
1.-(l) One or more members of a class of persons may 
commence an action on behalf of the memben of the class. 
(2) A person who commences an action under subsection (l) z,. 114 
&hall be known as the representative plaintiff. 
(3) The representative plaintiff shall give notice in writing to Nocim• Ano.., 
the Attorney General of the commencement of the action. c..-. 
CUTiflCATION 
1-(1) Alter the commencement of an action under section 2, 
the representative plaintiff may apply to the court for an order 
catilying the action as a class action. 
(2) An application under subsection (l) shall be commCllccd 
within 90 days from the day upon which the defendant filed his 
appearance or from the defendant's default in so doing. 
(3) Subject to section 6, the court ahall certify the action u a 
dus action if the court finds that. 
(o) the action i1 brought in 1ood faith and there ii a 
reuonable pouibilicy that material queetiont ol fact 
and law common 10 1he 01111 will be molved 11 1ri1I in 
favour or the class; 
(b) the class is numerous; 
(c) there arc questions of fact or law common to the class; 
(d) a class action would be superior to other available 
methods for the fair and efficient resolution of the 
controversy; and 
(,i) the representative plaintiff would fairly and adequalcly 
protect the interests of the class. 
4. In determining whether a class action would be superior to 
other available methods for the fair and efficient resolution ol 
the controversy, the court shall consider all relevant matters 
including. 
(a) whether questions of fact or law common to the mem-
bers or the class predominate over any questions arroct-
ing only individual members; 
(b) whether a significant number of members of the claa 
have a valid interest in individually controlling the 
prosecution of separate actions; 
(c) whether the class action would involve claims that are or 
have been the subject of any other proceedings; 
(d) whether other means of resolving the claims are lea 
practicable or less efficient; and 
(,) whether the administration of the clua action would 
create greater dircicultica than thOM likely to be ex-
perienced if relief were sought by other practicable 
means. 
5. In determining whether the representative plaintiff would 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, the court 
may consider whether provision has been made for competent 
legal representation that is adequate for the protection of the 
interests or the class. 
6.-(1) Where the court finds that the conditions set out in 
subsection 3(3) have been satisfied, it may nevertheless refuse to 
certify the action as a class action if, in the opinion of the court, 
the adverse effects of the proceedings upon the class, the courts 
or the public would outweigh the benefits IO the clua, the COIH1I 
or the public that might be .ecured if the action were Clnified. 
j , 
i 
(1) The onus ol establishing that an action lhould DOt be ~ 
certified u a clus action by reuon of subsection (I) ia upon the 
pmon to 00n1endln1, 
7. The court shall not refuse to certify an action as a class 
action on the ground only that the relief claimed, 
(a) includes a claim for damages that would require individ-
ual assessment in subsequent proceedings involving the 
defendant; or 
(b) arises out of or relates to separate contracts between 
members of the class and the defendant. 
8.-(1) Upon an application under section 3, the representa-
tive plaintiff and the defendant shall serve and file one or more 
affidavits setting forth the material facts upon which each 
iatends to rely and in which each deposes that he knows of no 
fact material to the application that has not been disclosed. 
(2) The maker of such an affidavit may be examined thereon m accordance with the rules of court u to discovery. 
9.-( I) An order certifying an action u a class action shall, 
(a) describe the class on whose behalf the action is brought; 
(b) describe the nature of the claim made on behalf of the 
members of the class and specify the relief claimed; 
(c) define the questions of fact or law common to the class; 
and 
(d) state whether some or all members of the class will be 
permitted to exclude themselves from the clau action 
and apecify a date before which such memben may 
exclude themselves. 
(2) The court may at any time amend an order certifying an 
action as a class action. 
(3) An order certifying an action as a class action includes an 
order amending such an order. 
10.-(1) Where the court refuses to certify an action u a class 
action, the court may order that the style of cause and the 
pl~ga be amended to eliminate any reference to the rq,re-
aentauon of members of the clus, and the action may proceed 
accordingly. 
laluptlMiw 
(2) Subjoct to IGCliona 13 and 14, where It appears to the coun 
that the oondldon1 In 1ubaectioft 3(3) .,. no ion,. Al.iafled, the 
court shall aet ulde the order certl.fying the action u • c1au 
action, and may make amendments to the proceedings to 
eliminate any reference to the representation of members of the 
class, and the action may proceed accordingly. 
COMMON AND INDIVIDUAL QUESTIONS 
11.-(1) In a class action, questions that are common to the 
class shall be determined in common proceedings, and questions 
that require the participation of individual members of the clau 
shall be determined in individual proc«dings under section lS 
or 31. 
(2) Where there arc common proceedings and individual 
proceedings, the court may give separate judgments in respect of 
each. 
INTERVENTION 
12.-( I) In order to ensure the fair and adequate protection o~ 
the interests of the class or for any other appropriate reason, the; 
court, at any time in an action under this Act. may permit one or 
more members of the class to intervene upon such terms and 
conditions, including costs, as it considers proper. ! 
(2) At any time in an action under this Act. the court may 
invite the Attorney General, or the Attorney General may apply 
to the court, to Intervene concerning any upc,ct of the action 
that raises a matter of public interest. including the matten 
raised in clauses 3(3)(d) and(~) and in section 6. 
SUBSTIT\TTION OF REPRESENTATIVE PLAINTIPP 
13. At any time in an action under this Act. the coun may, 
upon finding that the representative plaintiff docs not fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class, or will not do so, 
make an order substituting another member of the class u the 
representative plaintiff. 
14. At any time in an action under this Act, if it is in the 
public interest that the Attorney General act u representative 
plaintiff and either the representative plaintiff does not or will 
not fairly and adequately protect the interesll of the chw or the 
representative plaintiff COlllCDll, 
(o) the cowt may invit.e the Attor'My o...& to be the 
repnaentatiw plaiatiff; 0, 
(b) the Attorney Oencra1 may apply to the oowt for.,.._. 
alon to be the repreaentative plaintiff, 
POWERS OF COURT 
15. The court. upon the application of a party or upon its own ,__.,_ 
motion. may make any order under this Act and all appropriate 
orders determining the course of the action for the purpose of 
ensuring the fair and expeditious determination thereof, includ-
ing an order to prevent undue repetition or complication ~ -the 
action, and the court may impose such terms and condiuons 
upon the parties u it considers proper. 
NOTICE 
16.-(1) After certifying an action as a class action, the court 
may order that notice be given to members of the clau informing 
them or the class action. 
(2) In deciding whether to order notice under this teetioo, the 
ClOUrt shall consider all relevant matters including. 
(a) the cost of giving notice; 
(b) the nature or the relief sought; 
(c) whether the court has determined that some or all of the 
members of the class may exclude themselvea from the 
class action; 
(d) the size of the claims of the members of the c:l&u; and 
(1) the total amount of monetary relief claimed in the 
action. 
(3) Where the court orders notice under this section. notice 
shall be given by advertisement. publication. posting or distribu-
tion. unless the court, having regard to the matters set out in 
subsection (2), orders notice by some other method, including 
individual notice to a sample portion of the class. and the court 
may order notice to be given in different ways to various 
members of the class. 
(4) Notice under this section shall include. 
(a) a brief description of the class action including the relief 
claimed; 
(b) a brief description of the class; 
~ .... ... 
........ ..... 
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(c) a statement that a member ol the claal wil1 be bound by 
any judan,ent on the qu•tlon1 common to the cl111; 
(d) if the court hu determined that individual members 
may exclude themselves from the class action, a state-
ment to that effect, indicating how and by what date the 
members may exclude themselves and the consequences 
to the members if they exclude themselves or fail to do 
so; 
(~) a statement that a member of the class may apply to 
intervene in the class action; 
{j) the name and address of the representative plaintirf to 
which further inquiries may be directed; and 
(g) any other information that the court considen proper. 
17.-(1) Where the court gives judgment for the class on the 
questions common to the class and individual proceedings under 
section 25 or 31 arc necessary, the court shall order that notice of 
the judgmcnt be given to the members of the class whose 
participation in such individual proceedings is required. 
(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, notice under this 
section shall be given by mail to members of the class who arc 
identifiable through reasonable means in terms of expense and 
effort, and by advertisement, publication, posting or distribu-
tion to members who arc not so identifiable. 
(3) Such notice shall include, 
(a) a statement informing the membcn of the class that a 
judgmcnt on the question, common to the class hu been 
given and that they may be entitled to relief thereunder; 
(b) a statement informing the memben of the clau of the 
steps necessary to establish their claims; 
(c) a warning that, upon failure to take such steps, the 
member will not be entitled to relief except by leave of 
the court; 
(d) the name and address of the representative plaintiff to 
which further inquiries may be directed; and 
(~) any other information that the court considers proper. 
o.-.i....,. 18.-( I) At any time in an action under this Act, the court may 
order such notice as it considers nccesaary to protect the 
intcrcsu of the members of the class and the parties or otherwise 
for the fair conduct ol the action, but the court aay !lot onlcr 
notice under thi• NCtion for the purpoee of requlr1na memben 
of the 01111 to take active me11ure1 to Include themlelvee In the 
clw action before a determination of the queatlons common to 
the class. 
(2) In deciding whether to order notice under this section, the Crillria 
court shall consider all relevant matters including. 
(a) the cost of giving notice; 
(b) the nature of the relief sought; 
(c) the size of the claims of the members of the class; and 
(d) the total amount of monetary relief claimed in the 
action. 
(3) Where the court orders notice under this section, notice 
shall be given by advertisement, publication, posting or distribu-
tion, unless the court, having regard to the matters set out in 
subsection (2), orders notice by some other method. including 
individual notice to a sample portion of the class, and the court 
may order notice to be given in different ways to various 
members of the class. 
(4) The court may determine by whom and to what extent the 
cost of notice ordered under this section shall be paid, and may 
apportion the cost between the parties. 
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19. Notice under section 16, 17 or 18 shall not be oivcn unless c-,...,....., 
... olmcioe the court approves its contents. 
EXCLUSION 
20.-(1) The court ahall determine whether some or all of the ..... 
members of the class should be permitted to exclude t.hermdYes 
from a class action. 
(2) In determining whether members of the class should be Cllwi. 
permitted to exclude themselves from the class action, the court 
shall consider all relevant matters including. 
(a) whether as a practical matter membcn of the clus who 
exclude themselves would be affected by the judgment; 
(b) whether the claims of the members of the clul are so 
substantial u to justify independent litigation; 
(c) whether there ia a likelihood that a significant number of 
members of the clus would ~ &o -.dude &hem-
NMII; 
Riptsol 
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(d) the eotl of notice De0CIIIU)' so inform memben of the 
clau of the claaa action and of their risht to e11tclude 
themaelvea; and 
(4!') the desirability of achievingjudicial economy, consistent 
decisions, and a broad binding effect of the judgment on 
the questions common to the class. 
(3) Where the court hu determined that some or all of the 
members of the class may exclude themselves, they may do 10 by 
informing the court in writing by a date specified by the court of 
their desire to be so excluded. 
( 4) The names of persons who have excluded themselves from 
the class action shall be set out in any judgment on the questions 
common to the class or in any settlement of the action under this 
Act. 
(5) A person who has excluded himself from the class action 
is no longer a member of the class for any purpose and is not 
entitled to any relief awarded in the class action. 
DISCOVERY 
21. Before the questions common to the class are decided, 
(a) the representative plaintiff and the defendant have the 
same rights of discovery against each other that are 
available in ordinary actions; 
(b) after discovery of the representative plaintiff, the de-
fendant may apply to the court to discover other mem-
bers of the class; 
(c) in deciding whether to grant leave to diacover other 
memben or the clue, the court ,hall consider all rel• 
vant matters including, 
(i) the stage of the class prooccdings and the issues to 
be determined at that stage, 
(ii) whether discovery is necessary for the purpose of 
the defence on the issues, 
(iii) the approximate monetary value of the individual 
claims, where monetary relief is claimed, and 
(iv) whether discovery will result in oppreaaioo, undue 
annoyance, burden or cxpenae for the memben ol 
the class; 
(d) a member of the clua ia subject IO the ..... unctiona 
under the ndea ol court u any pu1y i. an action for 
failure to aubmh to dlacovery, cntcept that the coun ahall 
not exclude a member or the clua from recovery unlna 
it determines that no other sanction ia adequate to 
protect the interest of the defendant; and 
(4!') the defendant shall not by subpoena require a member 
of the claaa other than the representative plaintiff to 
attend to be examined for the purpose of using bit 
evidence upon any motion or application except by 
leave of the court, and in deciding whether to grant such 
leave, clauses (b), (c) and (d) apply rm,1a1u mwandir. 
MONETARY RELIEF 
22. In a class action where, 
(a) monetary relief is claimed on behalf of the memben of 
the class; 
(b) no questions of fact or law other than the assessment of 
monetary relief remain to be determined in order to 
establish the liability of the defendant to some or all 
members of the class; and 
(c) the total amount of the defendant's liability, or part 
thereof, to some or all of the members of the clua can be 
uaesaed without proof by the individual memben of the 
clus with the same degree of accuracy u in an ordinary 
action, 
the court shall determine the aggregate amount of the defend-
ant's liability and givejudgment accordingly. 
13.-(l) Where the court giveajudgment under aect.ioa 22 and 
the identity of any members or the class and the amount of 
monetary relief to which each is entitled can be determined from 
records in the possession, custody or control of the defendant, 
the court may direct the defendant to make such determinations 
and. subject to section 45, to distribute the amounts so deter-
mined to each class member directly by any means authorized 
by the court. 
(2) Where the court gives judgment under aectioo 22 but no 
order is made under subsection (l), the court shall order the 
defendant to pay into court or aome other appropriate depolito-
ry the total amount of the liability so determined. 
Agiqllll -
24. Where the court gives judgment under section 22 but does DiNcl 
not order the deleodant to make a direct dil&riti.&ioa under =:.--"' 
Individual 
dutributioe 
E..cllllloa f,-•-. 
di11ributioa 
subsection 23( I). and the identity ol any members ol the class 
and the amount of monetary relief IO which each ii entitled can 
be determined without rcquirin& evidence from each 1uch cl111 
member, the court ahall ao determine the amount to which each 
such member of the class is entitled, and order that the amounts 
so determined be distributed directly to such class members by 
any means authorized by the court. 
25.-(1) Except where an order is made under section 23, 24 or 
subsection 26(1), the court shall afford the members of the class 
a reasonable opportunity to claim their respective shares of a 
judgment given under section 22. 
(2) For the purpose of establishing the claims of members of 
the class, the court shall authorize such procedures as will 
minimize the burden imposed upon the clua members, includ-
ing the use of standardized proof of claim Corms designed to 
elicit the information necessary to establish and verify such 
claims, the reception of affidavit, documentary, or other written 
evidence, and the auditing of claims upon a sampling or other 
basis. 
26.-(1) Where the court givesjudgment under section 22 but 
the circumstances render impracticable the determination of the 
members of the class who are entitled to share in the judgment or 
the exact share of the judgment that should be allocated to 
particular class members, the court may order that the members 
of the class arc entitled to share in such judgment on an average 
or proportional basis if it is satisfied that failure to so order 
would deny recovery to a substantial number of class members. 
(2) Where the court makes an order under this section, the 
court shall afford members of the class who apply to be e,i;cluded 
from an order under subsection (I) a reuonable opportunity to 
establish their claims under section 2S, and the amount ao 
established and awarded to such class memben shall be deduct-
ed from the amounts to be distributed under subsection (I). 
27.-(1) The court may order that any money that hu not 
been distributed under section 23, 24, 2S or 26 be applied in a 
manner that may reasonably be expected to benefit some or all 
of the members of the class, and for this purpose the court may 
order that any such money be returned to the defendant upon 
such terms and conditions respecting its use as the court consid-
ers proper. 
(2) The fact that an order made under this section may 
benefit persons who are not members of the class or who have 
already received monetary relief under section 23, 24, 2S or 26 is 
not a bar to the making of such an order if the court is satisfied 
that a reasonable number of memben of the class who would not 
otherwi1e receive monetary relief will blnellt thereby. 
28. The coun may order that any money that bu DOI beml 
distributed under aection 23, 2'4, 25, 26 or 27 be foffeited IO the 
Crown or returned unconditionally to the defendant u the court 
conaldera proper. 
29. Before the court makes an order under section 27 or 28 or 
approves a settlement containing as one of its terms provision 
for the application of undistributed money in a manner provided 
for by section 27, notice shall be given to the Attorney General 
who may make submissions respecting the propriety of such an 
order. ' 
30. Where the total amount of the liability of the defendant or 
part thereof to some or all of the members of the class cannot be 
determined under section 22 or where the amount or monetary 
relieC to which each member or the clau is entitled cannot be 
determined as a common question, the court shall order individ-
ual proceedings for the assessment of monetary relief under 
aection 31. 
INDIVIDUAL PROCEEDINGS 
31.-(1) Where the court determines the common questiom in 
favour of the class, and subsequent proceedings that require 
participation by members of the class and the defendant are 
necessary to determine individual questions, the court may, 
(a) conduct such proceedings alone or with other judges of 
the court; 
(b) appoint one or more persons to conduct auch proceed-
ings by way or inquiry and report; or 
(c) on consent of the derendant, and of the repreaentative 
plaintiff on behalf of the class, order such proceedinp 
and give directions for the conduct thereof. 
(2) The court may give such direction.au may be necessary 
for the conduct of proceedings under clause (l)(a) or (b), 
including any directions to achieve conformity of proceedings, 
and in giving such directions the court shall order the simplest, 
least expensive and most expeditious method of determining the 
issues that is consistent with justice to the members of the class, 
the defendant and the representative plaintiff, including dis-
pensing with any procedure that it considers unncoeuary and 
directing special procedures regarding such matteri u dilcovery, 
admission of evidence and means of proof. 
(3) The person who has conducted proceedings under clause 
(l)(b) shall record his finding., in a report which is not effective 
until confirmed by lhe court. 
f--· c---· ........ 
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(4) The determination of any individual quaationa under this 
,ection con11i1ute1 ajudament. 
32. Where the court makes an order under section 2S con-
cerning the manner in which a member of the class may claim his 
share of a judgmcnt or where individual proceedings arc re-
quired under section 31, a member of the class who fails to ta.kc 
such further action as is necessary to establish his entitlement to 
the relief claimed within the time prescribed by the court is not 
entitled to proceed under section 2S or 31 except by leave of the 
court. 
• 
JUDGMENTS 
33.-(1) The court may direct that any amount awarded under 
section 22 or 31 shall be paid either in a lump sum, whether 
forthwith or within such period as the court may fix, or in such 
instalments and upon such terms and conditions as the court 
considers proper. 
(2) The court shall supervise, and may stay for a reasonable 
period, the execution or distribution of the whole or any part of a 
judgmcnt upon such terms and conditions u it considers proper. 
34.-(1) Judgmcnt on the questions common to the class ia not 
binding upon persons who have excluded themselves from the 
class action or upon the defendant in any subsequent prooced.ing 
brought by a person who has excluded himself . . 
(2) Judgment on the question, common to the clua binds 
every member of the class who hu not excluded himself from the 
class action to the extent only that thejudgmcnt determines the 
question, common to the clua that are defined in the order 
certifying the action u a clau action and that relate to the claim 
detcribed and the Nlllef 1peclfled In the order. 
(3) Ajudgment on the questions common to the class shall, 
(a) name or describe the members of the clau who are 
bound by thejudgment; 
(b) describe the nature of the claim made on behalf of the 
members of the class and specify the relief awarded; and 
(c) define the questions of fact or law common to the class. 
LIMITATIONS 
3S.-(l) Any limitation period applicablo &.o u a.clioD under 
this Ace ii auapended f« the IDIIDblrl"' ... dul llpOII the 
commencement of the aclion and ....,.. r--a ....- a 
member of • cl111, 
(a) upon his exclusion trom the clus action under section 
20; 
(b) upon his exclusion from the class description by reason 
of an order made under subsection 9(2); 
(c) except as to any party, upon an order made under 
scc:tion 10; or 
(d) upon dismissal or the action without an adjudication on 
the merits. 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), the limitation period ....,F 
resumes running u soon as all rights of appeal have been 
exhausted or all appeals have been disposed of, as the cue may 
be. 
SETTLEMENT, ETC. 
36.-(1) An action commenced under this Act shall not be 
settled, discontinued or dismissed for want of prosecution 
without the approval of the court and upon such terms and 
conditions, including notice or otherwise, u lhc court CIOlllidcn 
proper. 
(2) Unless the court orders otherwise. the cost of any notice 
ordered under this section may be determined by agreement of 
the parties. 
APPl!AU 
3'7.-( I) An appeal Ilea to the Dlvialonal Court from an order 
certifying or refusing to certify an action u a clua action cw 
setting aside an order certifying the action as a cl.us action. 
......,_ ., .... 
(2) With leave or a judge of the High Court. an appeal lies to ~ .... 
the Divisional Court from an order amending an order certifying .;,. .._ 
an action as a class action. 
(3) For the purpose of subsection (1) or (2), if the rcpn:scnta-
tive plaintiff docs not appeal or if he abandons his appeal. any 
member of the class may apply to a judge of the High Court for 
leave to appeal on behalf of the class. 
38.-(1) AA appeal lies to the Court of Appeal from a Juda· ~-
ment on the qu.tiom common to the clua. -..... 
=:::.._ (2) For the purpoee of aubeeccion (I). if the ~tativc, 
.....,. plaintiff doea noc appeal or if he abandon• hi• appeal, any 
member or the elm may apply to th1 Court of Appeal for leave 
to appeal on behalf of the class. 
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39.-(1) Wherejudgment has been given under section 22 and 
shares of the judgment have been determined under sections 23 
to 26 or where judgment has been given under section 31, any 
member of the class who has been awarded more than $1,000 
may appeal to the Divisional Court and any member of the class 
who has been awarded $1,000 or less may apply to the Divisional 
Court for leave to appeal. 
(2) Where judgment has been given under section 22 and 
shares of the judgment have been determined under sections 23 
to 26, the representative plaintiff may appeal to the Divisional 
Court an award to a member of the class for more than $1,000, 
and may apply to the Divisional Court for leave to appeal an 
award to a member of the class for $1,000 or less. 
(3) Where judgment has been given under section 31, the 
defendant may appeal to the Divisional Court an award to a 
member of the class for more than $1,000, and may apply to the 
Divisional Court for leave to appeal an award to a member of 
the class for $ I ,OOO or less. 
(4) For the purpose of this section, leave to appeal shall be 
granted only where there has been a substantial miscarriage of 
justice. 
40. Where an order has been made under section 27 or 28, the 
representative plaintiff, the defendant or the Attorney General 
may appeal to the Court or Appeal. 
COSTS AND FEES 
41.-(1) Notwithstanding section 80 of the Jwiicatur~ Act. but 
subject to section 46, costs shall not be awarded to any party to 
an action under this Act at any stage of the proceedings 
including any appeal, except, ' 
(a) on an application for an order certifying the action as a 
class action, where the court ia of the opinion that it 
would be unjust to deprive the successful party of costs; 
(b) in the event of vexatious, frivolous or abusive conduct 
on the part of any party; or 
. (cJ on an interlocutory motion. 
(2) Subject to aeccion 46, aecurity for coeu lhall not be 
required In an ICltlon commenced under thl1 Act, 
...... 1.,...:. -
(3) Subject to section 46, the members of the clw, other than ci.....,.,. 
the representative plaintiff, are not liable for costs. :,. liable"" 
42.-( 1) Notwithstanding section 30 of the Soliciton Act and 
An Act r~specting Champ~rty, a solicitor may make an agreement 
in writing with the representative plaintiff regarding payment 
for fees and disbursements in respect of an action commenced 
under this Act stipulating for payment only in the event. of 
success in the action. 
~ ....... 
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(2) For the purpose or this section, success in the action ....,.,. Mioe 
includes a judgment in favour of some or all members of the 
class on the questions of fact or law common to such members or 
a settlement that benefits any member of the class. 
(3) An agreement under this section shall not stipulate the "-'"' 
amount of the payment either by a gross sum, commission. c,:;:,o;:io 
percentage, salary or otherwise, and any such stipulation is void. 
(4) Where the representative plaintiff and his solicitor have 
~ade an agreement under this section, the court that has given 
Judgment on the common questions or has approved a settl~ 
ment shall, at the conclusion of any individual proocedings or at 
such other time and upon such terms and conditions as the court 
considers proper, 
(a) determine the amount of the solicitor's fees and, in 
addition thereto, an amount that is fair and reasonable 
compensation to the solicitor for the risk incurred by 
him in undertaking the action on a buia of payment 
only in the even,t of success; and 
(b) determine the amount of disbursements to which the 
solicitor is entitled. including interest thereon calculated . 
on the balance of disbursements incurred as totalled at 
the end of each six month period following the date of 
the agreement, 
and shall order that such amounts be paid to the solicitor in 
accordance with section 45. 
43. Where the representative plaintiff and his solicitor do not 
~ve an agreement under section 42, the court that has given 
Judgment on the common questions or has approved a settl~ 
ment shall, ~t the conclusion of any individual proc:eedings or at 
such other llme and upon such terms and condition, u the court 
considers proper, determine the amount of fees and diabuno-
menta payable by the representative plaintiff to the solicitor and 
1hall order lha1 NCh IIIIOlmt be pa6d IO the 10Hchor, 
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on .... ,.... 
4'. Decerminatiom under NCdoa 42 cw 43 lball be made by a 
. _judp. 
4'--(1) The amount ordered to be paid to the solicitor under 
section 42 or 43 constitutes a first charge, payable on a propor-
tional basis, against any amount awarded to the memben of the 
class. 
(2) Where individual proceedings are ordered under section 
31 and the defendant is ordered to pay an amount of monetary 
relief to a class member, that amount shall be paid into court 
and shall not be paid to the class member. 
(3) Upon the determination of the amount of the solicitor's 
payment under section 42 or 43 and payment thereof, the court 
shall order the distribution of the amounts to which individual 
class members are entitled. 
46. In any proceedings under section 31, 
(a) the costs provisions of the rules made under the Prq,,Jn-
cial Court (Civil Division) Project Act apply to claims of 
$3,000 or leu and their applicability ahall not be re-
stricted to The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto; 
and 
(b) the costs provisions of the Judicatun Act and of the rules 
of court apply to all other claims. 
47. Where judgment is given under section 22, the court may 
order that the costs of distribution, including costs of notice and 
payment of an appropriate fee to the penon administering the 
distribution, be paid out of the proceeds of thejudgment. 
48.-(1) The representative plaintiff or the defendant may 
serve on the other party an offer to settle an actioo under thi1 
Act. 
(2) After service of the offer, the court, upon application, 
lhall determine whether the offer is reasonable. 
(3) Where the court hu determined that the offer is reason-
able but it is not accepted. the court may award COits against the 
offercc, 
(a) if the representative plaintiff ii the offeree and the 
amount ultimately awarded to the members of the clau 
is less than the amount offered; or 
(b) if the defendant is the offeree and the amount ultimately 
awarded &o &he memba'I ol uae dau is greater than the 
amount offered. 
Ol!NltML 
49, - ( I) Th, Murt m1y 1dmll 1111l11loal, lnoludlna aampllna, 
evidence In an action under thla Act It auch evidence waa 
compiled in accordance with principles accepted by experts in 
the particular field. 
(2) Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), a 
collection, compilation, analysis, abstract or other record or 
report of statistical information prepared or published under the 
authority of the Parliament of Canada or the legislature of a 
province or territory of Canada may be admitted in evidence. 
(3) Statistical, including sampling. evidence under subsection 
(1) or (2) is not admissible unless the party intending to in-
troduce it has given reasonable notice to the party against whom 
it is intended to be introduced together with a copy of such 
evidence. 
. ( 4) . Where evidence is of a kind mentioned in subsection (2) or 
1s dcnved from market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories 
or other compilations generally used and relied upon by the 
public or by persons in particular occupation&, any notice siven 
under subsection (3) shall specify the source of auch evidence. 
(S) Except where subsection (4) applies, notice given under 
subsection (3) shall specify the name and qualifications of every 
person who participated in the preparation of the statistical or 
sampling evidence and shall specify whether any additional 
documents were prepared or used in the compilation of such 
evidence, and any party who receives such a notice may require 
that any such document be produced for inspection, except 
documents that would reveal the identity of any persona re-
sponding to a survey who have not consented in writing to such 
disclosure. 
... 
ONiltot _ .. .,. 
~ 
(6) Any party against whom any evidence of a kind men- oO.••--••• 
tioned in subsection (4) ia introduced may require for the 
purpose of cross-examination the attendance of any penon 
under wh~ aupervision the evidence wu prepared, and any 
party again,t whom any evidence of a kind mentioned in 
subsection .<S) _ia introduced may require for the pwpoee of 
cro_u-exanunauo~ the attendance of any person who participat-
ed m the preparauon of the evidence. 
. !O. An action under this Act shall not be tried by ajlJd&e with .i.;., 
•Jury. 
5~.-(1) In an action under this Act, the same judge ah.all ......_;.Ip 
p~es1de at all ~tiona and interlocutory prooeedinga before the 
trial of the questions common to the class and, subject to aection 
31 and IUINlla the pan;. and the jud,e OCbenriN .... another 
Wbnt,.121 ol 
llS.O. 1910, 
c. 22) does DOI 
l!>PIY 
Rultsoloowt 
apply 
llults-ybt 
mod< 
llS.0. 1980, 
c.22) 
judge shall preside at the trial of the questions common to the 
class and thereafter. 
(2) If, at any time in an action under this Act, the presiding 
judge is unable for any reason to continue, another judge shall 
be designated in accordance with the practice of the court. 
(3) In an action under this Act. section 121 of the Judicat11n 
Act docs not apply unless the Chief Justice of the High Court 
orders otherwise. 
52. The rules of court, except to the extent that they are 
inconsistent with this Act and the rules made under section S3, 
apply to actions under this Act. 
53. The Rules Committee may make any rules under the 
Judicature Act necessary or advisable to carry out effectively the 
intent and purpose of this Act. 
54. The Crown is bound by this Act. 
Commmmnm1 55. This Act comes into force oo the day 
Applic11ioftol 
Act 
Shontitlt 
of , 198 . 
56. This Act docs not apply to, 
(a) any action commenced before this Act comes into force; 
(b) any action brought by a person in a representative 
capacity that ia authorized by any other Act; or 
(c) any action that before this Act comes into force wu 
required to be brought by a pcnon in a representative 
capacity. 
57. The short title of this Act ia the Cla.u Actions Act, 198 . 
APPENDIX 2 
~ COORT RULES 1965 (ENGLAND>. ORDER 15. RULE 12 
12.~ 1) Where numerous penoo, have the same interest in any proceedings, not 
being such proceedings as are mentioned in Ruic 13, the proceedings may be 
begun, and, unless the Court otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one 
or more or them u representing all or as representing all except one or more or 
them. 
(2) At any stage of proceedings under this Ruic the Court may, oo the 
application or the plaintiff, and on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit, appoint any 
one or more or the defendants or other persons as representing whom the 
defendants arc sued to represent all, or all except one or more, or those penons in 
the proceedings; and where, in exercise or the power conferred by this paraaraph. 
the Court appoints a person not named a.s a defendant, it shall make an order 
under Ruic 6 adding that person as a defendant. 
(3) A judgmcnt or order given in proceedings under this Ruic shall be bindina 
on all the persons as representing whom the plaintiffs sue or, a.s the case may be, 
the defendants arc sued, but shall not be enforced against any person DOl a party 
to the proceedings except with the leave of the Cowt. 
(.C) An application for the grant of leave under paragraph (3) must be made by 
summons which must be served personally on the person against whom it ii 
sou&ht to enforce the judgment or order. 
(S) Notwithstanding that a judgment or order to which any such applicatioa 
relatei; is binding on the person against whom the application is made, that 
penori may dispute liability to have the judgment or order enforced apinsl him 
011 the ground that by reason or facu and matters particular to his case he is 
entitled to be exempted from such liability. 
(6) The Court hearing an application for the grant of leave under paragraph (3) 
may order the question whether thejudiment or order is enforceable against the 
person apin.st whom the applntion is made to be tried and dde:rmined in any 
manner in which any issue or questioa in u actioo may be tried and determined. 
APPENDIX 3 
,:KDERAL RULES or CIVIL PROCKOORE or THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COORT. RULE 23 
Rule 23. Oass Actions 
(a) Prerequisites to a Oass Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the class. 
(b) Oass Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the 
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(I) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class 
would create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the 
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing 
the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a 
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the 
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; 
or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the 
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a 
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the 
interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense 
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the 
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a 
class action. 
(c) Determination by Order Whether Oass Action to be Maintained; Notice; 
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Oass Actions. 
(I) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class 
action. the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order 
under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the 
decision on the merits. 
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to 
the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances. 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will eitclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date : (8) the judgment. whether favorable or not. will include all members who do not request eitclusion : and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires. enter an appearance through his counsel. (3) Thejudgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (bXI) or (bX2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (bX3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (cX2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class. · 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (8) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly. 
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (I) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (S) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule 16. and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time. 
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. 
APPENDIX 4 
SUPREME COORT ACT 1958 (VIC'l'ORIAL s 62<1Cl 
Where provision is made by any Act, law or rule for two or more persons to be 
joined in one action as plaintiffs one or more of such persons may 
notwithstanding any Act, law or practice to the contrary but subject to any 
direction as to the procedure to be followed in the action given by the Court 
or a Judge in any particular case sue on behalf of or for the benefit of all 
the persons who may be so joined. 
FEDERAL COORT RULES (AUSTRALIA), ORDER 6 RULE 2 
Two or more persons may be joined as applicants or respondents in any 
proceeding-
(a) where-
i)if a separate proceeding were brought by ... each of them ... some common 
question of law or fact would arise in all the proceedings; and 
(ii) all rights to relief claimed in the proceeding ... are in respect of or 
arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions; or 
(b) where the court gives leave so to do. 
\ppliution lo be m.adc IO 
Jio. "'1.lo• 10 c:o111inw It 1 
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SUPREME COORT RULES (SOOTH AUSTRALIA). RULE 34 
Repreaen~the ActJon1 
34.01 (I) Where numerous pcrn>ns have common questions o( fact or 
law requiring adjudication, ooe or more memben of that group or persons 
may commence on action as representative parties on behalf or aU or some 
or (he &fOUp. 
(2) Without dcrogatini from the general words of ,ubruJe (I). In actions 
ror the protection of property including actlons by rcmalndennen or rever-
sioncrs, and in actions in the nature or waste or a dcvastavit. ono person 
may sue on behalf or himself and of ~II persons having the same JntercsL 
(Oawio Ml , 
J..t.Ol The rcprestntativc parties must within twcnty-ci£ht days al\er 
the day upon which the dtrendanl filed the appearance., or. after the date of 
l~e defendant's default in doing so, apply to the Court for. 
(a) in order authorising the action to be maintained u a repre-
sentative action: 
(b) directions as to the conduct of the action. 
34.0J Authorisation shall not be refused on the ground: . 
(a) that the relief claimed includes claims for damages that would 
require individual use1smenl; 
(b) that s.eparatc contracts or tra.nSActions made wilh or cntcrtd 
Into between the members of the group rcprestnted and the 
defendant arc involved. 
34.04 An order that an action iJ to be maintained as I representative 
action shall: 
{a) define the group on whose behalf the action is brought; 
(b) define the nature of the claim or claims made on behalf of 
members or the group and specify the rcUc( claimed; 
(c) define the questions or law or fact common to the claims or 
membcn or the group . 
and make such other orders and give such directions as the nature of the 
proceedinis may require. 
34.0S An order that an actlon be maintained as a represent.alive action 
may be varied upon the appliC3tion o( any party at any lime before judgmcnt 
in the action. 
34.06 Questions which arc common to the group shaU be dettnnined 
in common procccdinp, and questions that require the panicipation of 
individual members of the group may be directed 10 be dealt with either in : 
separate actions or by separate trials within the action. 
J..4.07 mlbuig in this Rule arrecu the bringing of derivative actions 
In relation to bodies corporate. 
~ powtr to allow 
tpftxntathn fof per,iet 
34.08 In addition to the ri~u and remedies given by the prec«ding 
subrufcs, where numerous ~rsons have the same interest in any procecdinp, 
the proceedings may be brouJht, and, unless the Court otherwise orders, 
continued, by or a,ainst any one or more of them as repr~nting all or as 
representing all except one or more of them. 
34.09 At any stage of proceedina.s under Rule 34.08 the Court may, 111 procu,d.i•. 11ncStt l4.0I 
on the application of the plaintiff, and on such terms. if any, as it thinks :;:,:._~r: ~i.c 
fit. appoant any one or more of the dcfcndanu or other persons as reprc~ ddellduu 
scnting the defendants who arc sued, to represent all, or all eAccpt one or 
more, of those persons in the proceedings; and where, in exercise of the 
power conferred by this Rule, the Court appoints a person not rumed as a 
dcfendnnt, it shall make an order adding that person as a defendant. 
34.JO A judgmcnt or order given In proc.eedings under Rule 34.08 Jud&JDcat 1, p,oc,c,cdlnp 
shall be binding on all the peNons as representing wbom the plaintiffs sue, ::!~~':' ~ai:~ oa 11 
or, as the case may be, the defendants are sued, but shall not be enforced eororood apl~d • pmoa 
against any person not a party to the procccdinp except with the leave of oot a~ 'Without lu¥C 
the Court. 
34.11 An application for leave under Ruic 34.10 shall be served per- ~ical.loa b lea\'S iancb 
sonally on the person or persons against whom it is soug.hl to enforce I.be pe~bc ICrwd . 
judgmcnt or order. · 
34.ll (1) Any person served with an appli~tion under Rule 34.11 1Up1aoffil'IOft ~ 
m.iy, notwithstanding the binding nature of a.ny order made under Rule ~:· 1 '° di&pQ&e 
34. 10, dispute his liability to have the judgmcnt or order enforced against 
him on the ground thal by reason of facts or matters particular to bis case. 
be is entitled to be exempted from liability. 
(2) Any question which arises as to whether a judgment or order made 
or sought to be made under Rule 34.10 ~ or ought to be enforce3bk lg3inat 
the person. or any of th, perwns, aplnst whom the application is made, 
may be tried and determined in any manner in which an issue or 4uestion 
in an action may be tried or determined. 
1 F1:e.w1. 
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